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SAME-SEX LOVING: SUBVERTING WHITE SUPREMACY
THROUGH SAME-SEX MARRIAGEt
Adele M. Morrison*
This Article marks the 40th anniversary of Loving v. Virginia-the landmark
decision that responded to the question of the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation
laws by firmly stating that the fundamental right to marry could not be restricted by
race-by taking up the issue of the case's applicability in the context of same-sex
marriage. The invocation of Loving has generally been in a manner that invites
comparisons between interracial and same-sex marriage. Pro same-sex marriage
arguments that utilize this comparison-which has come to be known as the "Loving
Analogy"-- include the decision's freedom of choice and antidiscrimination elements,
but rarely incorporate the Supreme Court's antisubordination message, as articulated
through its anti-white supremacy stance. This Article seeks to rectify that. It argues
that same-sex marriage subverts White supremacy by undermining heterosupremacy,
countering notions of White superiority, and, because of the very existence of interracial
same-sex couples, striking society "color-blind," thus rendering race temporarily
invisible. This Article reaches the condusion that same-sex marriage is a civil rights
issue that works against heterosupremacy and White supremacy and that Loving v.
Virginia is indeed a case that can and should be extended to sanction same-sex
marriage and support Lesbian and Gay couples.
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"The right to marry whoever [sic] one wishes is an elemen-
tary human right compared to which "the right to attend an
integrated school, the right to sit where one pleases on a bus,
the right to go into any hotel or recreation area or place of
amusement, regardless of one's skin or color or race" are minor
indeed. Even political rights, like the right to vote, and nearly
all other rights enumerated in the Constitution, are secondary
to the inalienable human rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness" proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence;
and to this category the right to home and marriage unques-
tionably belongs."'
INTRODUCTION:
LOVING (AND) SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS
In the landmark 1967 civil rights case, Loving v. Virginia,2 the
United States Supreme Court determined, in part, that anti-interracial
marriage laws were discriminatory because they were "[based on] in-
vidious racial discrimination ... [and] . . designed to maintain white
supremacy!' 3 Forty years later, Loving has become a cornerstone of social,
political, and legal arguments in support of civil marriage rights for
same-sex couples. 4 Same-sex marriage advocates most commonly
1. Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, DISSENT 6, No. 1, Winter 1959, re-
printed in SAtE-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 145 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 2004).
2. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. Id. at 11.
4. See Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 216 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal.Iptr.3d 675, 699
(Cal. 2006); See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996)
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invoke Loving in two ways: 1) Arguing that restricting marriage to only
one man and one woman' is similar to barring Whites from marrying
non-Whites;6 thus, barring two people of the same sex from marrying,
violates the proposition that the fundamental right to marry is fully real-
ized only if one can marry a person of her7 choice.8 2) Contending that
denying civil marriage rights to same-sex couples is sex or sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, which parallels the race discrimination found
unconstitutional in Loving.9 However, when advocates invoke Loving to
support comparing same-sex marriage to interracial marriage 0-a com-
parison that has come to be known as the "Loving analogy" 1-rarely do
they note that the opinion contains an antisubordination message,
1 2
(applies Loving to argue that barring same-sex marriage is sex-discrimination, sexual ori-
entation discrimination and violates substantive due process); SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO &
CON, 88-90 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 2004) (includes Loving as one of eight cases determined
to be key in the arguments for and against same-sex marriage).
5. See Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.A. 5 7 (1996) [hereinafter DOMA].
6. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 4-5, nn.3-4; Va. Code Ann. 55 20-54 (1960
Repl.Vol.) (prohibiting marriage between Whites and non-Whites and declaring such
marriages void ab initio).
7. 1 use female pronouns throughout this Article. These references are intended to
encompass both male and female unless indicated otherwise.
8. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
9. See infra Part I.B.2. (discussing sex discrimination and sexual orientation dis-
crimination arguments).
10. For the purposes of this Article I will not add the qualifier "mixed-sex" to the
term "interracial marriage," unless specific to the context. See, e.g., infra Part I.C (discuss-
ing interracial mixed-sex and interracial same-sex couples). This is because marriage, as
generally understood, is defined and legally recognized as a union between two people of
differing sexes or genders. It is because of this understanding that qualifiers such as "same-
sex" are necessary. See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing the debate around defining marriage).
This unspoken understanding that the word marriage, standing alone, indicates hetero-
sexuality is a subtle aspect of heteronormativity. (See infra note 163 and accompanying text
(defining heteronormativity)).The term interracial, has also been used to modify the term
marriage because, as discussed herein, marriage was socially constructed and legally recog-
nized only if it was intraracial.
11. See infra Part I.A.1 (defining the Loving analogy and discussing the debate sur-
rounding it).
12. In this context, antidiscrimination is utilized to discuss laws and policies that are
specific to those individuals prevented from accessing civil marriage rights based on race,
gender or sexual orientation.Whereas, antisubordination addresses groups who are kept in
a subordinate status through, for example, limiting access to marriage rights. See, e.g., Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.YU. L. REV.
1003, 1007 (1986) (stating that the anti-subordination perspective seeks to eliminate
power disparities through the development of laws and policies that directly redress those
disparities); See RICHARD DELGADO AND JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN IN-
TRODUCTION 145 (2001) ("Discrimination: Practice of treating similarly situated
individuals differently because of race, gender, sexual orientation, appearance or national
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articulated in the Supreme Court's rebuke ofWhite supremacy.13
This Article focuses on the antisubordination aspects of Loving and
the Court's anti-White supremacy determination, arguing for their appli-
cability in the same-sex marriage context. It specifically asserts that same-
sex marriage subverts White supremacy and therefore should be an addi-
tional invocation of Loving in the fight for same-sex marriage rights.
Further, this Article contends that accepting and including lesbian and gay
relationships in society in general and sanctioning same-sex marriage in
particular, extends and expands upon the Loving decision represented
herein by three principles: 1) freedom of choice, 2) antidiscrimination,
and 3) antisubordination. While the argument does assert the applicability
of the Loving analogy, it does not assert that racism and heterosexism are
the same, nor does it compare or rank oppressions.14 The effort here is to
argue that indeed gay rights are civil rights.With this in mind, this Article
argues that extending fill marriage rights to couples whose partners are
the same sex, in the way Loving extended full marriage rights to interra-
cial couples, benefits not only Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
(LGBT)"5 persons but people of color as well.
These three Loving principles, specifically as they relate to race, are
more fully defined as follows: 1) freedom of choice means that marriage is
a fundamental right that is only fully realized by being able to marry the
person of one's choice regardless of race; 6 2) antidiscrimination stands for
the idea that prohibiting interracial couples from marrying constitutes
race discrimination; and 3) the antisubordination principle means that
maintaining White supremacy, ' s and thereby subordinating non-Whites,' 9
origin."); See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
ArE. 107 (1976) (differentiating between antidiscrimination and antisubordination).
13. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (internal citation omitted).
14. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 36 (South End Press
Classics 2d ed. 2000)(1984) ("Suggesting a hierarchy of oppression ... evokes a sense of
competing concerns that is unnecessary."); see Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk, 2007
Wis. L. REv. (forthcoming, 2007) (asserting that an argument which categorizes homo-
phobia and heterosexism as "the same as" racism, serves to divide rather than unite
subordinated groups).
15. This Article uses LGBT as an inclusive term for sexual minorities and commu-
nities consisting of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning and/or queer identified
people.
16. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
17. Id.
18. ROBERT JENSEN, THE HEART OF WHITENESS: CONFRONTING RACE, RACISM AND
WHITE PRIVILEGE 3-4 (2005) (defining white supremacy as "an ideology of the inherent
superiority ofWhite Europeans over non- Whites[.]").
19. Throughout this paper, I refer to non-Whites and people of color interchangea-
bly. While much of my argument is generalizable to the racial and racialized ethnic and
religious groups, in the twenty-first century United States, some of it is not. Thus, exam-
ples used herein will be situated in a Black/White context because of the particular lived
[VOL. 13:177
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(more specifically Blacks),20 is not a legitimate reason to bar persons from
marrying. There are analogous principles grounding the arguments sup-
porting same-sex marriage: 1) freedom of choice means that the
fundamental right of marriage extends to all citizens, and "person of one's
choice" includes a person of either sex, regardless of the gender of the
individual exercising the right;21 2) antidiscrimination stands for the prin-
ciple that prohibiting two persons of the same sex from marrying is
discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation; 22 and 3) an antisubor-
dination principle means that heterosupremacy 23 is also not a legitimate
reason to bar persons from marrying.24 These principles, as they relate to
same-sex marriage, clearly correspond to and mirror the Loving decision's
articulated principles. This Article argues that the comparison between
interracial marriage and same-sex marriage is valid because of legal and
social similarities between antimiscegenation and anti-same-sex marriage
laws and the structural commonalities and social impacts of white su-
21premacy and heterosupremacy.
Part I of this Article summarizes the debate around comparing in-
terracial marriage and antimiscegenation laws to same-sex marriage and
laws barring such unions. It introduces the Loving analogy, discusses its
uses and addresses the definition of marriage, which, though not
experiences of Blacks in the United States (including my own), especially as it relates to
Loving, interracial marriage and comparisons to same-sex marriage. In addition, while a
discussion of the specifics as to the way race works within and upon other racial and ra-
cialized ethnic groups in the context of marriage and intimate relationships is important, it
is beyond the scope of this work.
20. In this Article, "Black" and "White" are capitalized when each refers to a specific
cultural or ethnic group within the United States of America. I use "Black" rather than
"African American" to ensure that persons living in the United States, who are not
Americans of African descent but who are perceived to be, or constructed as "Black" are
included in this discussion.
21. See infra Part I.B.1.
22. Infra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the sexual orientation discrimi-
nation argument).
23. As used herein, "heterosupremacy" is constructed by combining the prefix "het-
ero" from heterosexual with "supremacy," meaning domination. It is defined as the
position that heterosexuals and heterosexuality are superior to lesbian, gay and bisexual
persons and non-heterosexuality. See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Understanding White Women's Ambiva-
lence Towards Affirmative Action: Theorizing Accountability in Coalitions, 71 UMKC L. Riv.
399, 415 n.86 (2002) (discussing factors in the break down of coalitions, including how
coalitions comprised predominantly of people of color fail to "recognize the claim of [an
LGBT based] identity group and thus break down over heterosupremacy); David Cruz,
'Just Don't Call it Marriage": the First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74
S. CAL. L. Risv. 925, 969 n.237 (2000) (discussing heterosupremacy in a First Amendment
context and referring to it as "one group in U.S. society being superior to another").
24. See infra Part lI.B. (for a discussion of the Loving principles).
25. See supra note 18 (defining white supremacy) and note 23 (defining heterosu-
premacy).
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specifically mentioned in Loving, is central to the debate. An illustration of
how the three principles-freedom of choice, antidiscrimination and anti-
subordination-work in the interracial and same-sex marriage contexts,
follows. The section concludes by contending that the Court's rebuke of
white supremacy is a vital aspect of the Loving analogy and, as such,
should be more fully incorporated into pro same-sex marriage argu-
26
ments.
Part II, entitled "Living Loving," endeavors to explain how same-sex
relationships challenge White supremacy. To do so it is necessary to
broaden the discussion to include non-marital intimate relationships be-
cause they are the majority of same-sex relationships.This section initially
addresses the subordinating ideologies of White supremacy and heterosu-
premacy, the manner in which they are interconnected and
interdependent, and how they mutually enhance each other. The argu-
ment is that even though interracial mixed-sex marriages may fulfill
Loving's choice and antidiscrimination principles, they also manage to help
maintain White supremacy by supporting heterosupremacy. 7 Conversely,
these subordinating ideologies work to allow same-sex marriage to
counter heterosupremacy and thus subvert White supremacy. This section
further explains how interracial heterosexual couples also help reinforce
White supremacy by enabling assumptions of White superiority, while
same-sex relationships do not. Finally, this section posits that society views
interracial same-sex relationships differently than interracial mixed-sex
relationships. Society is struck "color-blind ' 28 by interracial same-sex re-
lationships and race is rendered temporarily invisible. As a consequence,
some same-sex couples-those who are interracial-directly counter not
only heterosupremacy but White supremacy as well.
The Article ends by focusing on same-sex marriage as a civil rights
issue. This section recaps the assertion that same--sex marriage expands the
Loving decision's antisubordination message, and argues that Loving can
and should be extended to support the determination that full marriage
rights are fundamental to ensuring all persons move out of positions of
subordination and gain full civil rights. Finally, reasoning that because it is
unlikely that the state will end its sanctioning of marriage, this section
concludes that it is important that all subordinated groups recognize that
26. Though this Article argues that extending marriage rights to same-sex couples
will be a net positive in the struggle against all forms of discrimination and oppression, I
am not necessarily pro-marriage. This means that I do not necessarily support the states
privileging one particular adult intimate relationship over others, and allocating benefits
based upon those privileged relationships.
27. See infra Part II, Section 1.
28. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1895) (HarlanJ., dissenting) ("There
is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.").
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society as a whole benefits if adults in intimate relationships are allowed
full access to marriage regardless of their race, sex, gender, or sexual orien-
tation and work together to achieve this result.
I. A LOVING COMPARISON: INTERRACIAL AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
"[T]he right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the
person of one's choice ...29
"To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a ba-
sis ... is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty . .,30
"In this case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute deprives indi-
viduals of access to an institution of fiundamental legal,
personal, and social significance-the institution of marriage-
because of a single trait ... "3'
A. "Our Right to Lov(e)"ing:32 The Debate Over Analogy,
Utilization and Definition
This part of the Article divides the debate surrounding Loving and
same-sex marriage into three major components: 1) whether the analogy
between interracial marriage and same-sex marriage is accurate; 3  2)
29. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
30. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
31. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,958 (Mass. 2003).
32. Borrowed from, OuR RIGHT TO LovE: A LESBIAN RESOURCE BOOK (Ginny Vida
ed. 1978).
33. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Marriage and the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black
Liberation, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 781, 789 (2005) (Advocating the Loving analogy to show
that the same, or similar, arguments once used to prohibit interracial marriage are used
today to prohibit same-sex marriage and emphasizing that marriage is as much of a fun-
damental right now as it was at the time of Loving); Mark Strasser, Loving, Baehr, and the
Right to Marry: On Legal Argumentation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 24 NovA L. REV. 769, 770
(2000) (using the analogy to show the importance of the use of marital laws for discrimi-
natory purposes and denial of fundamental rights). But see, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge,
Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L.
201, 204 (1998) (stating that the Loving Analogy is a political argument rather than a
sound legal argument since marriage will have to be redefined in order for same-sex mar-
riage to be legalized); Dale M. Schowengerdt, Defending Marriage: A Litigation Strategy to
Oppose Same-Sex "Marriage", 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 487, 497, 501 (2002) (arguing against
the power and usefulness of the analogy outside of a political realm. The analogy is "hol-
low" when examining equal protection and it is "inapposite" to state marriage laws); Marc
S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. RPEv. 359, 441 (2001) (arguing
that the theoretical similarities between race and gays and lesbians does not alone compel
the analogy of Loving).
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whether gays and lesbians have a right to "use" Loving to support legal,
political, moral, and social arguments for same-sex marriage;34 and 3)
whether the definition of marriage itself is restricted to one man and one
woman.
1. The "Loving Analogy"
The term "Loving analogy" is used in this Article in a general sense
to refer to the similarities and differences between interracial and same-
sex relationships in social and political contexts. It is also used in a legal
context to refer to the doctrine produced by the decision itself. When
addressing the Loving analogy in the legal arena, this work maintains that
the Loving court's due process declarations about the findamental right to
marry and freedom of choice,3 s as well as the equal protection holdingS • 36
denouncing invidious racial classifications, are both key aspects of pro
same-sex marriage arguments. The Loving court also pronounced that
White supremacy is not a legitimate governmental interest:
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independ-
ent of invidious racial discrimination that justifies this
classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial
marriages involving White persons demonstrates that the racial
classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
34. See, e.g.,Andersen v. King County 138 P3d 963, 1037, (Wash. 2006) (BridgeJ,
dissenting) ("both the plurality and the concurrence are too quick to reject the Loving
analogy."); see also Kennedy, Marriage and the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Liberation,
supra note 33, at 789 (noting that "The Loving analogy is a heuristic device that acknowl-
edges the distinctions but underscores the similarities between prohibitions on interracial
marriage and prohibitions on same-sex marriage," and that it can and should be used in
such a way in order to support same sex marriage). But see Monte Neil Stewart & William
C. Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and Loving, 2005 BYU L. REV. 555, 557
(2005) (arguing Perez and Loving "restored to marriage the integrity of its institutional
purposes and logic" and this accomplishment "is now being betrayed" by the use of these
cases to justify same-sex marriage); Deb McCown, Black Pastors Assail Gay Analogy, THE
WASH. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A16 (quoting Bishop Paul Morton, Baptist Church leader,
"'[Y]ou insult African Americans when you say that this is a civil rights issue."').
35. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fun-
damental to our very existence and survival[.]" (citing Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541, (1942) ("The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to
marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the
freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and
cannot be infringed by the State.")).
36. Loving, 388 U.S at 10 ("The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in
the States." (internal citations omitted)).
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designed to maintain White Supremacy. We have consistently
denied the constitutionality of measures, which restrict the
rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt
that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added) .3
This works considers that statement to be equally as vital as the others
38used to support the pro same-sex marriage position.
The absence from pro-same sex marriage discourse of the Court's
statement denouncing white supremacy 39 may be due to LGBT mar-
riage-rights advocates' failure to comprehend fully that bans on same-
sex marriage have a racial component-as manifested in the existence of
LGBT persons of color and interracial same-sex couples who wish to
marry 0 Same-sex marriage rights advocates may have limited knowledge
of the realities of the lives of LGBT people of color. For example some
14%, or 85,000 same-sex couples who self-identified on the 2000 US
Census were Black same-sex couples. Other census based studies assert
that "[p]roposed anti-gay marriage state and federal constitutional
amendments will disproportionately harm Black same-sex couples and
37. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12.
38. See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960 (Mass. 2003)
("The plaintiffs challenge the marriage statute on both equal protection and due process
grounds"); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006) (noting that plaintiffs presented
both due process and equal protection claims); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963,
968 (Wash. 2006) (plaintiffs presented both due process and equal protection claims);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y 2006) (plaintiffs presented both due process
and equal protection claims); Justin T. Wilson, Preservationism, or the Elephant in the Room:
How Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage Deceive Us Into Establishing Religion, 14 DUKE J. GEN-
DER L. & POL'Y 561, 573-76 (2007) (discussing same-sex marriage, substantive due process
and equal protection, in the context of defining marriage).
39. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
40. 1 have determined from personal knowledge and plaintiff profiles as presented
by Lamda Legal and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that several same-sex
marriage cases have interracial couples in the plaintiff group. See Andersen v. King County,
138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2004) (eight same-sex couples wanted to be in a civil marriage); City
and County of San Francisco v. State, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1030 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(twelve same-sex couples petitioned for marriage licenses in California); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y 2006) (five same-sex couples petitioned for marriage licenses
in New York); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (seven same-sex couples peti-
tioned for marriage licenses in New Jersey); see also, Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-
005390 (Md. Cir. Ct.Jan. 20, 2006) (Lawsuit was filed on behalf of nine same-sex couples
and a man whose partner recently passed away charging that a state law denying same-sex
couples the right to marry violates the Maryland Constitution); Samuels v. NewYork State
Dept. of Health, 811 N.YS.2d 136 (N.YA.D. 2006) (13 couples throughout New York
were denied the right to marry in the state); http://www.lambdalegal.org;
http://www.aclu.org (providing plaintiff profiles).
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their families because they are already economically disadvantaged com-
pared to Black married opposite-sex couples, as well as compared to
White same-sex couples.' More fundamentally, there may be a lack of
understanding of how subordination is maintained by interconnected race
and sexuality based oppression.42 This limited comprehension and lack of
understanding leads to truncated arguments, which may translate into
fewer successes in legal and political arenas. 43 This Article suggests a way
to include people of color, their issues and experiences, and asserts that it
may be beneficial in future arguments on the side of advancing same-sex
marriage rights.
2. Using Loving
Those who argue that same-sex marriage rights advocates should
not "use" Loving to further their cause generally assert that race and ra-
cism are too different from sexual orientation and homophobia to
warrant a comparison. 44 Though, as noted above, direct comparisons may
41. ALAIN DANG & SOMJEN FRAZER, NAT. GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST.
& NAT. BLACK JUSTICE COAL., BLACK SAME-SEx HOUSEHOLDS IN THE UNITED STATES: A
REPORT FROM THE 2000 CENSUS 5 (2d. ed. 2005),available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/
downloads/reports/reports/2000BlackSameSexHouseholds.pdf(discussing the dispropor-
tionate impact of same-sex marriage bans of Black LGBT couples).
42. See infra Part II.A.
43. The numbers of states that limit access to marriage to couples consisting of one
man and one woman vastly outweigh the number of states with any form of legal recogni-
tion of same-sex couples. See generally Human Rights Campaign, Maps of State Laws and
Policies, available at http://www.hrc.org/issues/5594.htm (follow "Proposed Constitu-
tional Amendments Limiting Marriage," "Statewide Marriage Prohibitions," and
"Relationship Recognition in the U.S." hyperlinks) (maps and lists detailing the laws re-
garding recognition or lack there of, for same-sex relationships). Together the maps and
lists show that one state issues marriage licenses to same-sex couples, five states provide the
equivalent of spousal rights at the state level through civil unions or domestic partnerships
and three states and Washington D.C. provide some state rights comparable to spouses, for
a total of 10 states granting any state-wide rights to same-sex couples. Compare with the
45 states with constitutional amendments or statutes restricting marriage to one man and
one woman. (last visited October 10, 2007). (Also on file with author).
44. See Lynn D.Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat
from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. Tx. L. REv. 735, 752-53 (1998) (arguing that race
is unrelated to any legitimate purpose for regulating marriage because it is not a behavioral
characteristic whereas sexual orientation is a behavioral characteristic directly relevant to the
state's interests in regulating marriage); DL Foster, Lets Just Call A Spade A Spade: Black and
Gay Not the Same, available at http://www.witnessfortheworld.org/cm03.htril (last visited
October 6, 2007); Christopher Curtis,Jesse Jackson: Gay Marriage Rights Are Not Civil Rights,
GA.COM/PLANETOuT.COM NETwoRK, Feb. 17, 2004, available at http://www.planetout.com/
news/article.html?date=2004/02/17/6 (last visited October 6, 2007). But see generally Dar-
ren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory
and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 566 (1997) [hereinafter D.L. Hutchinson,
[VOL. 13:177
Same-Sex Loving
prove unproductive or divisive," that does not mean that there are no
similarities and differences46 in the marriage context that warrant exani-
nation.
Critics further assert that that Loving was a case strictly about raceand " . 47
and miscegenation. As such, the case belongs only to the Civil Rights
Movement era, standing as one of its major victories. 'Loving was indeed
a victory for the Civil Rights Movement because it struck down laws
supporting racial discrimination aimed at Blacks, countered the doctrine
49of white supremacy and rendered obsolete the legal status of the "one-
drop rule"' limitation of rights based on ancestry. However, it was also
a victory for privacy, marriage, and family, rights advocates' since it
Unseen] (arguing that sexual orientation and race and issues facing LGBT persons and
people of color are much more complex than simple comparisons between the two would
lead one to expect and calling for the creation of a "multidimensional gay and lesbian
discourse;" A discourse that would include identities along multiple axes); Angela On-
wuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. 873, 875-76 (2006) (discussing the
inaccuracy the idea that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals can pass for heterosexual, thus finding
that comparing the struggle LGBT persons have to the struggle blacks have because of
their visible skin color may be valid.)
45. See Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
46. KEiTH BOYKIN, ONE MORE RIVER TO CROss: BLACK AND GAY IN AMERICA, 30-84
(1996) (asking the question "Are blacks and gays the same?" and responding that there are
"similarities but differences too.").
47. See Coolidge, supra note 33, at 208 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw 530 (1993)
(HeenJ dissenting) (internal citations omitted));; Schowengerdt, supra note 33, at 497 (stating "In
short Loving was about invidious racial discrimination."); see generally Stewart & Duncan,
supra note 34 (arguing the what Loving did was to counter a white supremacist anti-
miscegenation "marriage project.").
48. Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American Civil Liber-
ties Union, Past, Present, and Future, 29 HAtv. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 143, 148 (Winter 1994).
49. See supra note 18 (defining white supremacy).
50. RACHEL F MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE & Ro-
MANCE 21 (2001) (explaining that the one-drop rule is "defined as black any person with
traceable African ancestry").
51. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (including
Loving to identify a right of "constitutional protection to personal decisions"); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,210-11 n.5 (1986) (BlackmunJ., dissenting) (arguing that Loving
is analogous to this case because both cases had laws in effect criminalizing conduct, yet in
Loving the Court determined those laws to be discriminatory); Compassion in Dying v.
State ofWash., 79 F3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 1996) (arguing that the reliance on the status and
history of laws prohibiting assisted suicide of terminally ill patients is inappropriate and
that Loving's antimiscegenation laws would still be in effect if the Court relied on history
and current status of such laws);Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795 n.1 (1st Cit. 1998)
(using Loving in a challenge to a school policy which used race as a determinative factor in
school admissions); Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (differentiating the race classifications in Loving from sex classifications in an equal
protection challenge to a county ordinance prohibiting female breast exposure but not the
male breast);YoungWomen's Christian Ass'n of Princeton, NJ v. Kugler, 342 F Supp. 1048,
1079 (D.N.J. 1972) (Garth, D.J., concurring in part dissenting in part)(invoking Loving in
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articulated the fundamental right to marry12 and nationalized the Perez v.
Lippold concept of marrying "the person of one's choice."'
3
With its anti-white supremacy position, Loving was also a victory for
the antisubordination principle itself.54 Loving helped to render visible the
fact that white supremacy was an ideology that law, politics, social con-
vention, and individual and group effort kept in place; not happenstance
or "god's will."" The Court showed that, in the context of race and inti-
mate relationships, white supremacy was a predominant social ideology
and was sanctioned by the state.56 After identifying white supremacist ide-
ology as real and invidious, 7 the Court then determined that the state's
actions in perpetuating white supremacy were constitutionally impermis-
sible.5 8
Loving can be a very useful analogy when addressing all forms of
subordination. If other subordinated groups, including those with LGBT
members, are able to render visible the ways in which they are being sub-
ordinated, and are also able to show that the oppression is occurring with
either governmental support or through governmental inaction, it should
follow that, by applying Loving, such actions would also be impermissible.
While it is true that Loving was a Civil Rights Movement victory, it
also stands as a case supporting civil rights. In other words, even though
Loving was a milestone for civil rights attached to the movement for Black
equality, it was also important for civil rights in the more generic sense.
These general civil rights' are applicable to many social, cultural, racial,
support of a broader concept of privacy in a challenge to New Jersey's abortion statutes);
Manlove v. Town of Hymera, No. TH01-0171-C-T/H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14722, at
*5 (S.D. Ind.June 18, 2002) (comparing the right to chose whom to date with the right
to choose whom to marry as established in Loving).
52. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
53. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948) (en banc) (expanding the definition
of family and extending the benefits and burdens of marriage to those who had been
excluded).
54. See supra note 12 (defining antisubordination).
55. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (citing the lower court's opinion addressing racial segrega-
tion "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed
them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he
did not intend for the races to mix.").
56. Id. at 11.
57. See Id. at 11-12 & n. 11 (indicating that the statute in question has no legitimate
purpose separate from racial discrimination and pointing out the title of the Virginia stat-
ute, "An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity," referred only to the "White race").
58. Id. at 12.
59. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (4th ed. 1968) (defining civil rights in the con-
text of constitutional law as "such [rights] as belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organiza-
tion or administration of government.").
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and ethnic groups and social movements. Case law establishing and ex-
panding the rights of the individual or group, both when precedent and
when not, becomes a part of the public domain, to be built upon or ex-
panded by those who agree and see thenselves as similarly situated. Loving
has been invoked repeatedly in contexts of equal protection and due
process jurisprudence, privacy rights, and sex discrimination, among oth-
ers.60 Today, Loving is a key component of the marriage rights debate. This
Article asserts that same-sex marriage is specifically related to the issues
addressed in Loving because same-sex marriage embodies and extends its
principles of freedom of choice, antidiscrimination, and antisubordination.
The specific debate over what Loving means is separate from the
question of what sort of resource Loving can be and for whom. As a Su-
preme Court decision, Loving is a landmark opinion that is part of the
nation's jurisprudential foundation. 61 This precedent setting decision can
be a resource for anyone who wants to use it to make a legal argument or
a political statement or simply as a rhetorical tool. Groups may disagree
about the contexts in which Loving's holdings may apply or may argue
that it is being misinterpreted, or even misused. However, to say that Lov-
ing cannot be used at all because one group disagrees with the usage by
another, is counter to the very purpose of legal precedents and reasoning
by analogy. Loving is far more than a Civil Rights Movement victory.
Though it is a vital part of Black history and culture, it is arguably just as
vital to all United States history and culture. Thus, Loving should be avail-
able to all who feel its findings resonate with them.
3. Loving and Defining Marriage
The debate over the definition of marriage in the context of Loving
and same-sex marriage centers around whether the language from Perez v
Lippold that was nationalized in Loving-"to marry the person of one's
choice 62-is gender neutral. Those who oppose same-sex marriage gen-
erally argue that by using the term "marry," the Court was referring to a
60. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
61. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 E3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that American
laws recognize marriage as a fundamental right and citing to Loving); Ex Parte Morales,
212 S.W3d 483, 502 (Tex. 2006) (stating that Loving and other cases determined that there
cannot be unnecessarily "unconstitutional infringement upon the marital relationship");
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 228 (N.J. 2006) (stating that there is "universal agreement"
that there is a "fundamental right to marriage rooted in the traditions, history and con-
science of our people," founded in part by Loving); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,383
(1978) (finding that Loving is the leading decision on the right to marry). see also
www.westlaw.com (Loving v.Virginia "citing references check" produces a "showing [of]
6781 documents"). (Last visited May 23, 2007).
62. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P2d 17,19 (Cal. 1948) (en banc); See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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union between one man and one woman.63 Consequently, "person" must
mean anyone of the "correct" gender or opposite sex. 64 This argument is
typically articulated in the following way: extending marriage rights to
same-sex couples changes the fundamental right itself by reshaping the
institution of marriage because "marriage" is a union between one man
and one woman. 65 The "anti" argument purports that regardless of how
the relationship is characterized, the union of two people of the same sex
is not a marriage and, therefore, Perez really determined that the nature of
the fundamental right to marry is the freedom to choose the one person
of the opposite sex with whom one wants to join in union.
Those supporting gay marriage rights assert that it is circular to ar-
66gue that what gays want is not marriage. The circular argument is the
following: gay people want to get married but the relationship they want
to enter into is not a marriage since only people of different genders can
get married; therefore, since what gay people want is not a marriage, they
cannot get married because a marriage is not what they can do.67 This
63. See DOMA, supra note 5 (defining marriage as "only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife); see also supra note 43 for a hyperlink to listing
of state laws).
64. This Article does not intend to include transsexuals who are married to indi-
viduals of the same biological or birth, sex of their non-transsexual spouse (e.g., a female-
to-male transsexual married to a non-transsexual female) in the category of same-sex
couples because they identify as different genders and may identify as a heterosexual cou-
ple. However, society and most current state laws consider these marriages to be same-sex
and thus void ab initio. See, e.g., Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d, 155, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004). ("[Determining] whether a postoperative female-to-male transsexual person
can validly marry a female under the current law of this state ... We hold that the law of
this state does not provide for or allow such a marriage; therefore, we reverse the final
judgment and remand for the trial court to declare the marriage of the parties void ab
initio.").
65. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1971) (finding that persons of
the same sex are not authorized to get married because Minnesota employs a common
usage definition of the term marriage as restricted to a union between two members of
the opposite sex); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 974-75 & n.3
(Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting) (arguing there was no equal protection violation be-
cause there was no person denied access to "the institution marriage" being a "civil union
of a single man and a single woman"); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1973) (finding "appellants are prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Ken-
tucky or the refusal of the County Court Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a
license, but rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is
defined").
66. See, e.g., Jones, 501 S.W2d at 589; see also SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO & CON,
supra note 4, at 90 (editor Andrew Sullivan describes Jones with the following language:
"The Court of Appeals of Kentucky sets out the classic legal argument: Marriage by defi-
nition involves a man and a woman. End of discussion." This is, as Sullivan tides the
section, "The Definitional Argument.").
67. See, e.g.,Jones, 501 S.W2d at 589 ("A license to enter into a status or a relation-
ship which the parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity. If the appellants had
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argument, however, winds its way around a path to answering a contrived
question. The circular argument induces a response to the question of
whether two people of the same sex can marry, but the "real" question is
whether it is in the State's power to extend marriage rights to couples of
the same gender. As courts in same-sex marriage cases have noted, the
answer to the "real" question is "yes" because, by having created civil mar-
riage in the first place, the State has defined marriage and continues to
define it.6 Defining marriage both determines its parameters and proce-
dures as well as who is allowed access to the institution, 69 and it is the
70State's responsibility under its regulatory powers, to do so.
While civil marriage is a social institution, it is also a legal one and
law determines the benefits and burdens that attach to it. This is exempli-
fied in the court's articulation in Goodridge that "While only the parties
can mutually assent to marriage, 7 1 the government determines "who may
marry and what obligations, benefits and liabilities attach to civil mar-
riage., 72 Marriage's parameters are State constructed and thus the State
can-directly or indirectly- discourage or encourage, restrict or allow, or
outright bar or specifically sanction persons in their quest to obtain or
exercise a right to marry.'3 The State determines which relationships, and
thus the people in them, are worthy of its blessings. Leaving same-sex
couples out, suggests that they, and LGBT people in general, lack worth
concealed from the clerk the fact that they were of the same sex and he had issued a li-
cense to them and a ceremony had been performed, the resulting relationship would not
constitute a marriage.").
68. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 952-53,965-66; Baker, 744 A.2d at 869, 883-89.
69. See NANCY E COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 2
(2000) (noting that "In the form of the law and state enforcement, the public sets the
terms of marriage, says who can and cannot marry[.]"). The state has determined that
individuals are barred from marrying persons too close to them in consanguinity or affin-
ity. Those who are already married are banned from marrying again prior to dissolution.
States set age limits on who may marry without parental consent. See In re Black, 283 P2d
887, 888 (Utah 1955) (addressing the ban on polygamy); Moe v. Dinkins, 533 E Supp. 623,
625 (S.D.N.Y 1981) (addressing the issue of age and marriage); Singh v. Singh, 569 A.2d
1112, 1113 (Conn. 1990) (addressing the ban on incestuous marriage);.
70. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 4 (2007) ("The legislature of each state has the power to
control and regulate marriages within its jurisdiction ... The courts have jurisdiction over
the marriage relation, its incidents, and its ultimate consequences, only as such jurisdiction
is conferred by statute.") (internal citation omitted).
71. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
72. Id.
73. See generally 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 4 (2007) (stating that the state's power to con-
trol marriage is only limited by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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and they are excluded from a host of benefits. Thus, LGBT communities
75have strong reasons to fight for access to marriage.
The definition of marriage--socially and at common law-has tra-
ditionally been specific to a union between a man and a woman.
However, lack of specificity on the Loving Court's behalf leaves room for
existing language to include persons of the same gender in that definition.
Furthermore, this Article advances the opinion that determining that
marriage rights are gender neutral invokes Loving, in that the Court's de-
cision manifested a broader reading of earlier definitions concerning those77
who could and could not access the fundamental right to marry. There-
fore allowing same-sex couples access to marriage is a logical
continuation of Loving's increased inclusivity. 8 In sum, a definitional ar-
gument against same-sex marriage is that marriage has always had one
consistent definition and therefore can never be redefined. However, the
courts in some same-sex marriage cases determined that the State could
define marriage in an expanded way-as a union between two consent-
ing adults-as the court did in Loving when it included persons of
different races as those eligible to marry each other.
B. What's It All About? The Loving Principles
This part of the Article separates the Loving analogy into three ma-
jor components, each addressing one of the Loving principles. Section
74. See Infra note 154 (listing over 1000 benefits, rights and privileges of marriage).
75. See, e.g., Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek The Right To Marry,
OUT/LOOK 8-12 (1989), reprinted in WILLiAVm N. ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN D. HUNTER,
SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAw 818-20 (1997) (stating that "[Marriage] is the center-
piece of our entire social structure ... Lesbians and gay men are now denied entry into
this 'noble' and 'sacred' institution. The implicit message is ... [glay relationships are some
how less significant, less valuable.").
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (8th ed. 2004) (defining marriage as the "legal
union of a couple husband and wife"). See also HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN
AMERICA: A HIsToRY 1 (2000) ("Throughout most of American history, marriage has
meant 'the legal union of man and woman, as husband and wife, for life."').
77. See Cott, supra note 69, at 4-8 (introducing the ways in which groups have been
excluded at various times from civil marriage); see generally STEPI-IANIE COON'rZ, MARRIAGE,
A HISTORY (2005)(discussing how the construction of traditional marriage and those who
are included as being able to be married has changed over time).
78. See CooNTz, supra note 77, at 256 (describing the state of anti-interracial mar-
riage laws prior to Loving); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 214-80 (2003) [hereinafter KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES]
(discussing the enforcement of and the response to antimiscegenation laws); MORAN, supra
note 50, at 112 ("Before Loving, antimiscegenation statutes made clear that race was an
immutable status presumptively relevant to marital choice."); MARIA P P RooT, LOVE'S




one addresses the freedom of choice principle and relates the Loving anal-
ogy to the issues of marriage as a fundamental right, and an individual's
freedom to choose whom to marry. This section considers whether these
principles work the same way in the differing contexts of race and sexual-
ity. Section two is centered on the antidiscrimination principle and
compares sex and sexual orientation discrimination to racial discrimina-
tion. Section three discusses the antisubordination principle. The focus is
on the Loving Court's anti-White supremacy stance and how it applies in
the same-sex marriage context.
1. Loving (is) Freedom of Choice
Loving reasserted the Court's determination in Perez v. Lippold"9 that
the fundamental right to marry meant choice.8 The court in Perez stated
that "[T]he essence of the right to marry is freedom to join in marriage
with the person of one's choice... "8, The freedom of choice principle is
employed in the pro same-sex marriage context to argue that if the deci-
sion to marry indeed does mean to marry the person of one's choosing,
then it should not be limited based on any identity-based characteristics
such as race, gender or sexual orientation. Opponents of same-sex mar-
riage may consider the above-referenced Perez quote incomplete without
the following phrase: "[A] segregation statute for marriage necessarily im-
pairs the right to marry.'8 2 The argument is that the complete sentence
supports the contention that both the Perez and Loving holdings only re-.- 83
lated to race and not gender or sexual orientation. However, Perez states
that since the fundamental right to marry is about choosing whom to
marry, then a law forbidding interracial marriages violates the Constitu-
tion.84 The main point of these statements is that the fundamental right,
like others in the privacy realm, 8' is in the decision-making; in this
79. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
80. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
81. Perez, 198 P.2d at 21.
82. Id.
83. See Coolidge, supra note 33, at 237 (specifically stating that the "courts of Vir-
ginia ... turned a case about marriage into a case about race". Further determining that
Loving represents "the triumph of marriage over racism" in particular not over lack of
choice in general); Schowengerdt, supra note 33, at 497; Spindelman, supra note 33, at 432-
40; Stewart & Duncan, supra note 34, at 575; Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Consti-
tutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 75-83 (1996) (stating the
Loving analogy fails because the focus of Loving is the divisions of race which is different
than the divisions created by sexual orientation).
84. Perez, 198 P2d at 18-19, 21.
85. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that a
state law banning use of contraceptives among married persons is an unconstitutional
infringement on the right to marital privacy); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
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situation deciding if, when and whom to marry. The Loving decision na-
tionalized the Perez "freedom to choose whom to marry" determination
but did not specifically state that making those decisions was limited to
choices based on race. Thus, the freedom of choice principle is applicable
in the same-sex marriage context because, arguably, the right attaches to
the choosing itself, not to the identity of the person an individual is
choosing to marry.86
2. Loving (is) Antidiscrimination
LGBT marriage-rights advocates also argue that anti-same-sex
marriage laws discriminate based on sex. Loving has been invoked to
analogize the race-based discrimination of antimiscegenation laws to this
sex-based discrimination. Pro gay marriage advocates further insist that,
since both race and sex are subject to heightened scrutiny under the U.S.
Constitution, the restrictions should fail constitutional muster. 8  This anti-
discrimination argument asserts that the court struck down
antimiscegenation laws because they discriminated based on race, even if
the restrictions were facially neutral. According to the statute in question
in Loving, both Whites and non-Whites could be sentenced to jail, and
both Mildred Jeter and her husband Richard Loving were banished from
the State of Virginia for 25 years. 89 Therefore, the argument continues,
courts should certainly strike down laws mandating that marriage licenses
should be given only to couples consisting of one man and one woman.90
(ruling that a Texas statute criminalizing sexual conduct between persons of the same sex
is an unconstitutional intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (determining the right to privacy found in the Bill of
Rights encompasses a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy).
86. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003) ("With-
out the right to marry -or more properly the right to choose to marry...").
87. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 162-72 (specifically addressing the sex
discrimination argument in the context of same-sex marriage); Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.YU. L. REv. 197,
199-201 (1994); Toni Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist from the Gender Police--
Why the Harassment of Gays and Other Gender Nonconformists is a Form of Sex Discrimination
in the Light of the Supreme Court's Decision in Oncale v. Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. R.Ev. 89, 103
(1999) (explaining that failing to conform to sexual stereotypes about how "real men" and
"real women" act results in harassment and different treatment of gay and lesbians and this
makes it sex discrimination).
88. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 162-72. See also, Koppelman supra note 87, at 199-
201; Lester, supra note87, at 103.
89. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,2-4 (1967) (discussing the facts of the case).
90. See The Human Rights Campaign supra note 43, http://www.hrc.org (follow
"Marriage" hyperlink under "Get Informed" then follow each state hyperlink) (last visited
October 6, 2007) (providing the text of all state statutes relating to same-sex marriage
definitions and marriage protection amendments; listing the states that have passed a law
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These laws, by specifically stating that marriage is restricted to one man
and one woman, fail to be even facially neutral. In those states with equal
rights amendments as part of their constitutions,9 ' because sex based dis-
crimination triggers the highest scrutiny, anti same-sex marriage laws
should fail state constitutional muster. This is what transpired in Hawaii
where the Court found that the law violated the state constitution's Equal
Rights Amendment.92
Though the sex-discrimination argument has been most commonly
invoked, an argument has also been made comparing the racial discrimi-S - 93
nation in Loving to sexual orientation discrimination. To date, there is no
binding precedent classifying gays, lesbians, and bisexuals as, in Equal Pro-
tection parlance, "suspect, 94 as in the case of race, or "semi-suspect, as
when gender is at issue. However, the Goodridge plaintiffs argued that sex-
ual orientation should be treated similarly to sex or race" and that laws
that discriminate based on sexual orientation should also be subjected to• 96
heightened scrutiny. Though the Supreme Judicial Court did not use
defining marriage as between a man and a woman and refusing to honor same-sex mar-
riages from other jurisdictions in response to the federal DOMA).
91. Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their Effec-
tiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1202-04,
1288-93 (2005) (twenty-two states have added equal-rights amendments (ERAs) to their
constitutions and all twenty-two prohibit all discrimination based on sex. Thirteen states
prohibit discrimination based on race, national origin or creed: Alaska, California, Con-
necticut, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming. Three states, Florida, Louisiana and Rhode Island, pro-
hibit discrimination based on physical handicaps).
92. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993). Subsequently the case was ren-
dered moot by an amendment to the Hawaii Constitution. See Haw. Const. Art I § 23
(allowing the legislature to "reserve marriage for opposite sex couples.")
93. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 29 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting)
("Limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples undeniably restricts gays and lesbians from
marrying their chosen same-sex partners whom 'to [them] may be irreplaceable' and thus
constitutes discrimination based on sexual orientation."); Michael Dorf, Identity Politics and
the Second Amendment, 73 FORDHAm L. REv. 549, 561-62 (2004) (proposing that Loving
states that laws prohibiting marriage based on one's race are race-based classification and
subject to strict scrutiny, therefore same-sex marriage prohibitions are laws restricting
marriage on the basis of sexual orientation and are thus sex based distinctions); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 4, at 172-82 (explaining the sexual orientation discrimination argument); Cass
R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1994) (arguing that "the
ban on same-sex relations will be seen as having much the same relationship to male su-
premacy as did the ban on mixed marriages to White Supremacy" therefore Loving will be
a key case in the fight against sex discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination).
94. But see Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F2d 1329, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en
banc, 875 F2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (the panel determined that sexual orientation was a
suspect classification).
95. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,960-62 (Mass. 2003).
96. Id.
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heightened scrutiny when evaluating the constitutionality of
Massachusetts's marriage law,97 it did determine that individuals were be-
ing denied access to marriage based on sexual orientation."
What about the Loving analogy? Is sexual orientation comparable in
any way to race? The argument contending that there are similarities
turns on comparing not race and sexual orientation themselves but result-
ing discriminatory effects. It is the discrimination based on sexual
orientation that is analogous to the discrimination based on race, deemed
by the Loving Court to be illegitimate. 99 The claim is that just as there was
"patently no legitimate overriding [governmental] purpose" for barring100
access to marriage based on race, there are no legitimate purposes to
restricting access to marriage based on sexual orientation. '
Therefore, even though no statute specifically bars LGBT people
from marrying--the state does not prevent a lesbian from marrying as
long as she marries a man yet she is barred from marrying another les-
bian-the result is discrimination based on sexual orientation. Though
this argument is also related to sex discrimination-it is discrimination
based on sex because a woman can marry a man but a man cannot marry
a man--sexual orientation is implicated because of the modern construc-
tion of marriage being based on love between a couple.10 2 As Professor
Holning Lau has noted, "a gay couple can never get married even though
a gay individual can. 0 03 This is because the union between a person who
is homosexually oriented and one who is heterosexually oriented cannot
truly fulfill the purpose of the socially constructed and legally sanctioned
"love-based"10 4 marriage even if the pair is able to meet the marriages
97. Id. at 961 (deciding that strict scrutiny did not apply strict scrutiny because the
statute did not survive the rational basis test).
98. Id. at 958 (determining that "individuals [were being denied] access to ... the
institution of marriage-because of a single trait.., sexual orientation here.").
99. See supra note 93 and surrounding text (discussing sexual orientation discrimi-
nation arguments).
100. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
101. See supra note 93 and surrounding text (discussing the sexual orientation dis-
crimination arguments).
102. See Coo~rrz, supra note 77, at 242-43, 247,278, 306 (discussing the evolution of
the 'love-pattern' in mate selection and stating that over the past two hundred years,
Americans began to see marriage as a personal and private relationships that should fulfill
their emotional and sexual desires. As a result, love is the main reason for marriage.). See
also, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) ("Civil mar-
riage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly
public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and fam-
ily.").
103. Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidis-
crimination Law, 94 CAL. L. Rav. 1271, 1321 (2006).
104. COONTZ, supra note 77, at 8,242- 43 (discussing the love-based marriage).
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contractual requirements."" The law has come to recognize the intimacy
necessary for there truly to be a marriage;' 6 therefore, a wedding that
takes place between a lesbian and a man, or two heterosexual women,
does not truly result in a marriage. '1 7 Comparably, under antimiscegena-
tion laws, neither Whites nor non-Whites were barred from marrying,
but both were prohibited from marrying someone outside their racial
category (White or non-White).' 8 Yes, a White person could marry an-
other White person, but if the union was not between her and the person
of her choice, it was not truly a marriage either. Thus, there is an applica-
ble analogy between the racial discrimination barred in Loving and
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The State bases marriage re-
strictions on the issues of identity so that individuals are barred not from
access to marrying altogether, but from truly being married.
3. Loving is Anti-White Supremacy
This Article contends that adopting either the freedom-of-choice
principle or the antidiscrimination principle, or both, leaves the pro
same-sex marriage argument incomplete. By failing to include Loving's
antisubordination principle, as articulated through the Courts anti-White
supremacist language, same-sex marriage advocates limit possibly
105. See 52 Am.Jur. 2d Marriage § 4 (2000) (stating that marriage is sometimes char-
acterized as a contract analogous to a partnership agreement, sometimes characterized as a
three-party contract between a man, a woman and the state, and sometimes characterized
as a personal relation which arises from a civil contract. However some jurisdictions follow
the view that the rights and obligations of marriage do not rest upon contract, but upon
the general law of the state, or that marriage is a contract as well as a status or legal condi-
tion.)
106. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (declining to deny civil marriage to same-sex
individuals since the Massachusetts state constitution forbids the creation of second-class
citizens, and stating that the exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nur-
tures love and mutual support, and brings stability to society).
107. See 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 6 (1991) (stating that inter-spousal obligations
arising out of the marriage contract "include sympathy, confidence, and fidelity, in addition
to comfort, love, companionship, and affection ... when a man and woman marry they
contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and support").
I am not asserting that variations of couples or groups of people cannot or do not
have relationships consisting of the attributes of marriage included in 41 C.J.S. § 6. My
point here is simply that even though the legal definition of what is included in the mar-
riage contract has expanded, it still presupposes sexual orientation symmetry. Because
LGBT same-sex couples have this symmetry, as do heterosexual mixed-sex couples, they
too can and should be included within the definition of those who may legally marry. A
fuller discussion of the fluidity and multiple continuums of constructed sexual identities is
beyond the scope of this paper.
108. See Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, n.l (1967) (citing the Virginia antimiscege-
nation law).
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successful alternative arguments and undermine the Loving analogy itself.
Moreover, by failing to address White supremacy, such advocates do not
attend to the argument that the Loving decision was specifically limited to
striking down antimiscegenation laws based solely on racial animus and
therefore designed to support the doctrine of White supremacy.' 9 This
failure to extend an antisubordination message leaves the pro same-sex
marriage argument vulnerable to the charge that the Loving analogy is
invalid.'10
Though the Loving Court specifically articulated that maintaining
White supremacy was not a constitutionally protected interest of the State
ofVirginia or any state, and further, that the State could not restrict who
could marry based on that doctrine,'1 the result has not been the eradica-
tion of White supremacy. Though de jure" 2 white supremacy may have
diminished in our culture, de facto"' white supremacy has not."4 In fact, it
remains tenaciously intact and helps to maintain a system of subordination
of which heterosupremacy is also a part."5 Nevertheless, the Loving deci-
sion's anti-white supremacy holding can be viewed as foundational in the
work to develop antisubordination jurisprudence and counter the domi-
nant/subordinate paradigm. So too is the Goodridge decision's extension of
marriage rights to same-sex couples a monumental step forward on the
path to equality.
Part II of this work seeks to show that the arguments in favor of
same-sex marriage are connected to Loving not only through the estab-
lished freedom of choice and antidiscrimination principles, but also
through its antisubordination principle. Part II further asserts that this
third principle of antisubordination provides support for the position that
LGBT relationships should be legally sanctioned and that extending mar-
109. See Id. at 11-12 (discussing white supremacy and racial animus). See also Stewart
& Duncan, supra note 34, at 579 ("Loving stands for the proposition that racial classifica-
tions are not grounds for denying the right to marry[.]").
110. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 974-78 (Spina,J. dissenting).
111. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
112. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 458 (8th ed. 2004) (defining De jure as "Existing by
right or according to law[.]").
113. Id. (defining De facto as "1. Actual; existing in fact; having effect even though
not formally or legally recognized ... 2. Illegitimate but in effect .... ").
114. See IAN E HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
197-202 (1996); KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, AT 35; cf. MORAN, supra
note 50, at 194 (explaining that minorities often self-segregate in choosing where to live);
BELL HOOKS, Overcoming White Supremacy, in TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING
BLACK 113 (1989) [hereinafter HOOKS, White Supremacy] (arguing that Whites "cannot rec-
ognize the ways their actions support and affirm the very structure of racist domination
and oppression[.]").
115. See infra Part II.A.
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riage rights to LGBT persons specifically continues and expands upon the
Loving Court's anti-white supremacy stance.
11. LIvING LOVING: INTERRACIAL RELATIONSHIPS, SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS,
ANTISUBORDINATION, AND WHITE SUPREMACY
"[l]t is important for us to remember that the struggle to end
white supremacy is a struggle to change a system, a struc-
ture."
1 6
" ... the straight mind develops a totalizing interpretation of
history, social reality, culture, language, and all the subjective
phenomena at the same time ... The consequences of this ten-
dency toward universality is that the straight mind cannot
conceive of a culture, a society where heterosexuality would
not order not only all human relationships but also its very
production of concepts ...,17
Loving has afforded interracial couples access to civil marriage.18
When a White person and person of color marry, each is exercising his or
her fundamental right to choose a partner," 9 and each is specifically coun-
tering racial discrimination by making that choice regardless of the other
person's race. Thus, the interracial mixed-sex couple clearly has a relation-
ship grounded in two out of three of Loving's principles-freedom of
choice and antidiscrimination. 1 A mixed-sex interracial couple may cross
the "color line"'' when they marry. However, though it may seem coun-
terintuitive, because of the intersectionality22 of race, gender and sexuality
116. HOOKS, White Supremacy, supra note114, at 119.
117. MONIQUE WITTIG, The Straight Mind, in THE STRAIGHT MIND AND OTHER ESSAYS
27-28 (1992), quoted in Kiss & TELL (GROUP OF ARTISTS), HER TONGUE ON My THEORY:
IMAGES, ESSAYS AND FANTASIES 59 (1994).
118. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,2 (1967).
119. Id. at 12.
120. See supra Part B.1-II (defining and discussing the freedom of choice and antidis-
crimination principles).
121. WE.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903) ix (New American Library
edition 1969) ("[T]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line.")
122. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vio-
lence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244-45 (1991)(applying the concept
of intersectionality to examine violence against women of color. Crenshaw advocates
analyzing such violence as a function of both gender and race.)). Intersectionality has been
expanded and is a foundational principle of Critical Race Theory; see DELGADO AND STE-
FANciC, supra note 12, at 149 (defining intersectionality as, "[b]elief that individuals and
classes often have shared or overlapping interest or traits.").
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based oppression, their union does not fully embrace the anti-white su-
premacy principle.
1 3
This section considers the ways interracial mixed-sex relationships
support, and same-sex relationships challenge, white supremacy. Three
postulates relating to how white supremacy influences and is influenced
by intimate relationships ground this inquiry. The claims are applied to
mixed-sex interracial couples and to same-sex couples. Each postulate is
then used to illustrate the idea that same-sex marriage can subvert white
supremacy.
The three postulates are the following: 1) Heterosupremacy and
white supremacy are interconnected aspects of a subordinating1 2 4 power
structure and thus each serves to support the other. 2) The intersection of
identities, i.e., race, gender and sexual orientation, makes it possible for
relationships to either support or challenge concepts of white superior-
125 126ity. 3) Relationships, by being normative or non-normative, can serve
to either increase or decrease of the visibility of race. 127
The postulates as applied to mixed-sex interracial couples and the
ways they support white supremacy are as follows: 1) By choosing to ac-
cess a social and legal institution that is nearly absolutely heterosexually
128exclusive, interracial mixed-sex couples are heteronormative -an ele-
ment of heterosupremacy-and thus, part of a social structure comprisedof iteronneted . . 129
of interconnected subordinations. 2) Because one of the persons in the
couple is White, in the cases of White/non-White interracial coupling,1 30
the couple continues to perpetuate ideas of white superiority based on
the presumption that a person of lower racial status is marrying up. T3 3)
Because of the race and gender dynamics operating on an interracial het-
erosexual couple, race is actually magnified rather than minimized in that
the couple is normative by being mixed-sex but non-normative by being
mixed race. This is a difference, which serves to accentuate the races of the
individuals within the couple. In effect, the postulates, as applied to
mixed-sex interracial couples which result in heteronormativity, white
123. See supra Part I.B.3.
124. See infra Part II.A.
125. See infra Part II.B.
126. Infra note 173 (defining normative). In this context normative couples are those
that, on some level, conform to cultural expectations by being intraracial or heterosexual.
127. See infra Part II.C.
128. See infra note 164 (defining heteronormative).
129. See infra Par II.A.
130. A discussion of "marrying-up" in the context of couples consisting of two indi-
viduals from different racial minorities is beyond the scope of this Article.
131. Infra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing marrying up).
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superiority, and racial magnification, serve to help maintain white su-
132
premacy.
Conversely, the postulates as they relate to how same-sex relation-
ships subvert white supremacy are: 1) by their very existence, same-sex
relationships counter heteronormativity which, in turn, undermines het-
erosupremacy and subverts all interconnected subordinations. 2) Same-sex
couples challenge conceptions of white superiority based on a narrow, but
socially pervasive perception of LGBT identity as a white cultural con-
struct' 33 and homosexuality as a detrimental lifestyle. 134 3) Interracial
same-sex couples, as the most non-normative, have a particularized im-
pact on racial visibility. Identifiable same-sex interracial couples may
render society "color-blind" lessening the visibility of race and the nota-
bility of racial difference. The postulates as applied to same-sex couples
indicate that non-heteronormativity, undermining white superiority and
rendering society color-blind serve to subvert white supremacy and to
further Loving's antisubordination principle. This strengthens the validity
of the Loving analogy 13' and arguments supporting its use in advocating for
same-sex marriage.
132. Cf Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativ-
ity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 Burr. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991) [hereinafter D.L.
Hutchinson, Heteronormative] (discussing the notion that some theorists fail to understand
that "systems of oppression do not stand in isolation").
133. See, e.g., BOYKIN, supra note 46, at 101 ("[Black straight people ... see homo-
sexuality as a white issue .... "); Sharon P. Holland, "Home" is a Four-Letter Word, in BLACK
QUEER STUDIES: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 4 (E. Patrick Johnson & Mae G. Henderson, eds.,
2005) (stating, "[Hiomosexuality was effectively 'theorized' as a 'White disease' that had
'infected' the black community."); Earl Ofari Hutchinson, My Gay Problem, Your Black Prob-
lem, in THE GREATEST TABOO: HOMOsExuALITY IN BLACK COMMUNITIES 4 (Delroy
Constantine-Simms ed. 2000) [hereinafter E.O. Hutchinson, My Gay Problem] (noting that
"leading afrocentrists swore 'homosexuality is a deviation from afrocentricity').
134. Compare George A. Rekers, An Empirically Supported Rational Basis for Prohibiting
Adoption, Foster Parenting, and Contested Child Custody by any person residing in a Household
that includes any Homosexually-Behaving Member, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 325, 359 (2005)
(listing reasons why homosexuals should not be legally recognized parents, including as
one reason that "Homosexual behavior is widely disapproved by the majority of the U.S.
population."); with, Lydia Saad, Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark: Public evenly
divided over whether homosexuality is morally acceptable or wrong, GALLUP NEws SERVICE, May
29, 2007, http://galluppoll.com/content/Default.aspx?ci-27694&VERSION=p (finding
that public tolerance for gay rights is at the high-water mark of attitudes recorded over the
past three decades; with only 37% of people polled believing that "homosexual relations
between consenting adults should not be legal," 39% believing that homosexuality should
not be considered an acceptable lifestyle 49% believe that homosexual relations are mor-
ally unacceptable).
135. See supra Part I.A. 1 (defining the Loving analogy).
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A. Interconnected Subordinations: Heterosupremacy and White Supremacy
This section first addresses the ways in which heterosupremacy and
white supremacy are interconnected and fundamental to the perpetuation
of the dominant/subordinate social structure. Several theories support the
premise that oppressive ideologies, including heterosupremacy and white
supremacy, are interconnected. For example, interest convergence theory
posits that gains will come for subordinated groups when their interests
converge with those of dominant groups. 136 Intersectional theory specifi-
cally shows that subordinations are interconnected, by demonstrating the
manner in which subordinating ideologies are differently operationalized
depending on the multiple identities of the subordinated group.1 37 Multi-
dimensional theory posits that sex, race, and class inequality are not
"separable, mutually exclusive, or even conflicting phenomena." 138 Sym-
biosis theory shows how "systems of subordination" are mutually
beneficial to each other; specifically stating that in fact "it is difficult, per-
haps impossible, to eliminate one form of subordination without attacking
the entire edifice of interlocking oppressions."' 39 I apply these critical
theories to support the notion that if there can be interconnectivity be-
tween dominant and subordinate groups there similarly is
interconnectivity between dominant ideologies. This interconnection is
what allows mixed-sex interracial relationships to assist in the perpetua-
tion of white supremacy while same-sex relationships contribute to its
subversion. Through subordination's intersectionality, 140  multi-
dimensionality,14' and symbiosis142 both forms of oppression, racism and
heterosexism,143 "converge"1 44 and support a particular group's dominance.
In this case, Whites and heterosexuals help maintain an elevated status for
each group and the status differences create power imbalances.' 4s For ex-
136. Derrick A. Bell Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HtAiv. L. RiEv. 518, 523 (1980) (describing convergence in the context of
blacks as the subordinate group, whites as the dominant group, and racial equality as the
interest at stake).).
137. See generally, Crenshaw, supra note 122, at 1241.
138. D. L. Hutchinson, Unseen, supra note 44, at 566.
139. Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. Rlv. 251,307 (2002).
140. Crenshaw, supra note 122, at 1249 ("Intersectional subordination need not be
intentionally produced; in fact, it is frequently the consequence of the imposition of one
burden that interacts with preexisting vulnerabilities to create yet another dimension of
disempowerment.").
141. See D.L. Hutchinson, Unseen, supra note44, at 566 (1997).
142. See Ehrenreich, supra note 139, at 307.
143. See Infra note 163 (defining heterosexism).
144. See Bell, supra note 136, at 523.
145. Haney Lopez, supra 114, at 197-99.
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ample, racial oppression serves to support white racial dominance and
helps to maintain an attitude of white superiority, which in turn helps
perpetuate a minority underclass. 146 Similarly, heterosexism and homo-14ba7 spot• 4
phobia support heteronormativity and limit LGBT persons' access to
social, legal and political power.
14
9
Dominant and subordinate identities exist along many axes. Group-
ing the most dominant characteristics together constructs a force that
subordinates those without the specified characteristics, i.e., racial white-
ness and "hetero" sexuality. Professor Francisco Valdes has referred to this
dominant force as "Euroheteropatriarchal elites."'" This label speaks to the
racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed aspects of the dominant, sub-
ordinate binary and their interconnectedness.
The most dominant group is composed of those who possess all the
traits or adhere to all the ideologies of the Euroheteropatriarchal elite and,
in turn, reap the most benefits."' Meanwhile, those in-grouped by virtue
of a single aspect of their identity, or by one part of the ideology, are able
146. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM ix-xii (Basic Books ed. 1992) (discussing his continued belief that racism is per-
manent); Haney Lopez, supra 114, at 200-02 (relating examples of how important
Whiteness is to White people, so much so that they will not give it up);Jensen, Supra note
18, at 4-7 (listing ways in which Blacks continue to be disadvantaged); ROBERT C. SMITH,
RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: Now You SEE IT, Now You DON'T, 105-07, 119-
39 (State Univ. of N.Y. Press 1996) (discussing the formulation and permanence of a Black
underclass and its connection with racism).
147. Infra note 163 (defining homophobia and heterosexism).
148. Infra note 163 (defining heteronormativity)
149. See The National Center For Lesbian Rights (http://www.NCLrights.org);
Human Rights Campaign, (http://www.HRC.org); Lambda Legal,
(http://www.LambdaLegal.org);American Civil Liberties Union, Lesbian and Gay Rights
Project (http://www.ACLU.org); for lists of issues relating to LGBT communities and
cases that are being addressed. (Examples of how LGBT people are limited include the
following: exclusion from Federal Hate Crimes Legislation; exclusion from laws prohibit-
ing discrimination in housing and employment, based on sexuality or gender identity;
being barred from openly serving in the Military due to the "Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy;"
barred from adopting children in the State of Florida (and effectively in other states due to
non-sexual-orientation-specific laws which bar non-married or single people from adopt-
ing), gay men being excluding from the Boy Scouts of America; and LGBT youth being
institutionalized).
150. Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Legal Theory and Outcrit Perspectivity: Postsubor-
dination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 831, 841 (1999) [hereinafter
Valdes, Outcrit]; see also Valdes, Identity Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of Euro-
American Heteropatriarchy, 71 UMKC L. REV. 377 (2002) (adding in the word "American"
after "Euro").
151. See generally JENSEN, supra note 18 at 3-14 (discussing the benefits of white su-
premacy and white privilege).
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to access partial benefits. 152 For example, White women-even though
disadvantaged because they are women-access some racial benefit by
being White. 1 3 Similarly, interracial heterosexual couples, while possibly
disadvantaged by virtue of being interracial, are able to access marriage
benefits15 4 by being heterosexual and thus a state-sanctioned couple.
Moreover, a White gay male couple, though disadvantaged by being a
homosexual couple, and therefore barred from marrying, has access to
racial and gender privilege.' Though some LGBT individuals and cou-
ples have access to varying types of privilege, the rights and benefits of
marriage, extended to interracial mixed-sex couples through Loving, con-
tinue to be denied to most same-sex couples at the State level5 6 and all
gay and lesbian couples at the Federal level.11
7
While white supremacy and heterosupremacy independently work
against each subordinating principle's particular target group-people of
color and LGBT persons, respectively-they also each work separately
and together to oppress the other group as well. White supremacy itself
supports racism within LGBT communities in a number of ways. LGBT
persons of color may be excluded from gay bars or clubs based on their158,,5
race. A gay White man may be branded a "dinge queen ' "9 or "rice
152. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 139, at 307 (arguing that "singly burdened"
White women are "clearly privileged" compared to their black counterparts).
153. Id.
154. See, Letter from U.S. General Accounting Office to Sen. Bill Frist (Jan. 23,2004)
(identifying over 1000 federal provisions in which marital status is a factor in determining
benefits, rights and privileges). See also, Religious Tolerance, Legal and Economic Benefits of
Marriage, available at http://www.religioustolerance.org/mar-bene.htm (last visited March
2, 2007) (enumerating the rights and benefits of marriage including various property rights,
parental rights, health care rights, decision making power, legal rights, and financial bene-
fits such as inheritance rights, insurance access and tax exemptions).
155. See generally Ehrenreich, supra note 139, at 256-59 (introducing "symbiosis the-
ory" by explaining that it includes the thesis that individuals can sometimes be dominant
and sometimes be subordinate).
156. Massachusetts is currently the only state, which recognizes marriage between
same-sex couples as a result of the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in Goodridge v.
Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) ("[B]arring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would
marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.").
157. DOMA Supra note 5. The act further states that it does not require that states
recognize same-sex marriage legalized in other states. See also supra note 154 (for a more
comprehensive listing of federal benefits of marriage and sources).
158. See Paul E. Pratt, HRC Finds Castro Bar Proprietor Discrininates, SAN FRANcisco
OBSERVER ONLiNE EDITION, May 4, 2005, available at http://news.sfobserver.com/news/
viewarticle.html?articleid=lfl5el7d7b3bed9d7c38a3fa6l2571be (last visited Mar. 1,
2007) (reporting that a popular gay bar in San Francisco "discriminate[ed] in employment
and public accommodations on the basis of race").
159. See Brad Sears, Dff'rent Strokes, VILLAGE VoicE, June 28, 2005, at 28 ("Come to
think of it, given my friends' reactions to my partners, I can't say the LGBT community
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queen' ', 6 0 for being in a relationship with a Black or Asian man. Such la-
bels embody racist stereotypes of people of color. National LGBT
organizations may include "progressive" groups or causes in their coalition
building but fail to address issues of importance to communities of
color.'61 Additionally, and most seriously, racialized aspects of some gay
bashings may be relegated to the margins, if acknowledged at all. 62
In turn, heterosupremacy is an oppressive force within communities
of color. These communities, like society as a whole, can be homophobic,
heterosexist and heteronormatve. 6 3 Homophobia may be verbally ex-
pressed by one person of color in response to another's coming out as'64
gay. Heterosexism may come in the form of "black intellectuals
goes easy on interracial couples. Or maybe I just don't understand the more positive nu-
ances of 'dinge queen.' Even friends who haven't directly criticized my partner choices
hardly let them go unnoticed. Most dismissively generalize that I'm 'into black men' on a
sample of one.").
160. See PAUL BAKER, FANTABULOSA: A DICTIONARY OF POLARI AND GAY SLANG 186
(2002) ("2. a gay man who likes Asians. Derogatory."); DONALD E REUTER, GAY 2 ZEE: A
DICTIONARY OF SEX, SUBTEXT AND THE SUBLIME 177 (2006) ("A white boy greatly at-
tracted to Asian men").
161. See Kate Kendell, Race, Same-Sex Marriage, and 4hite Privilege: Th7e Problem with
Civil Rights Analogies, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 133-35 (2005) (noting that if LGBT
people of color were more visible in the LGBT rights movement, the black community's
negative reaction to analogies between then San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsome and
past civil rights leaders might have been more moderated); see also Press Release, National
Center for Lesbian Rights (Nov. 8, 2006) (celebrating many of the results of the 2006
elections, including the defeat of "the most draconian anti-abortion measure ever pro-
posed; decrying the anti-marriage measures that passed but not mentioning the anti-
affirmative action law in Michigan). (Copy on file with author.)
162. See D. L. Hutchinson, Unseen, supra note 44, at 567-69 (arguing that the murder
of Julio Rivera, a gay Puerto Rican man, could be "characterized as an act of 'racist-
homophobia,' rather than a 'gay' bashing"-which is the way LGBT activists viewed the
crime, referring to it as "the Gay Howard Beach").
163. MAGGIE HUMM, THE DICTIONARY OF FEMINIST THEORY 119, 123 (2d ed. 1995)
(defining homophobia as "the fear of homosexuality in oneself or others" and heterosex-
ism as "the unconscious or explicit assumption that heterosexuality is the only 'normal'
mode of sexual and social relations."); Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Sur-
viving Same-Sex Partners: Defining Family Through Tragedy, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 31, 34-5, n.16
(2002) ("Heteronormativity" is defined as "the view that heterosexuality is 'the elemental
form of... association, as the very model of intergender relations, as the indivisible basis of
... community, and as the means of reproduction without which society wouldn't exist."'
(quoting Michael Warner, Introduction to Fear OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND
SOCIAL TFiEORY xxi (Michael Warner ed., 1993)).
164. See Retired NBA Star Hardaway Says He Hates "Gay People", ESPN.coM NEWS
SERVICES, FEB. 16, 2007, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?
id=2766213 (last visited May 12, 2007). (Tim Hardaway an African American former
professional basketball player "said on a radio show ... 'You know, I hate gay people ... I
am homophobic. I don't like it. It shouldn't be in the world or the United States." Har-
daway was responding to a question asked "a week after [John] Amaechi (Who is Black)
became the first former NBA player to say he was gay.").
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associating homosexuality with the community's decline."' 65 Heteronor-
mativity may require LGBT persons to be closeted in order to be
welcomed within the community. As author bell hooks related in Homo-
phobia in Black Communities, the level of required closetedness may vary
but still has a negative impact.
Sheer economic necessity and fierce white racism, as well as
the joy of being there with the black folks known and loved,
compelled many gay blacks to live close to home and family.
That meant however that gay people created a way to live out
sexual preferences within the boundaries of circumstances that
were rarely ideal no matter how affirming. In some cases, this
meant a closeted sexual life.'
66
Finally, with issues such as same-sex marriage being so controversial, het-
erosupremacy can manifest itself not only as support for white supremacy
but also white supremacist organizations.'
67
Challenging either white supremacy or heterosupremacy will neces-
sarily influence the other form of oppression. This is evident from the
ways in which white supremacy functions within LGBT communities
and the ways in which heterosupremacy operates within communities of
color. Additionally, each form of oppression targets the communities
themselves in that racism targets people of color and heterosexism and
homophobia target the LGBT community. Failure to work against one
helps ensure the other's continued strength.' 68 Thus, a failure to adhere to
165. BOYKIN, supra note 46, at 157.
166. See BELL HOOKS, Homophobia in Black Communities, in TALKING BACK supra note
114, at 120-21 [hereinafter HOOKS, Homophobia]; see also, Walter Naegle, Biography, Bayard
Rustin (1912-1987), Brother Outsider: The Life of Bayard Rustin, available at http://www.
rustin.org/biography.html (last visited May 22, 2007) ("As a gay man, relatively open for
his time, Bayard Rustin experienced anti-gay prejudice in addition to racial discrimina-
tion. Because of his sexual orientation as well as his controversial political positions, he was
often relegated to a behind-the-scenes role in various campaigns ... [However Mr.
Rustin] was the Deputy Director and chief organizer of the 1963 March on Washington
for Jobs and Freedom which, at that time, was the largest demonstration in the nation's
history.").
167. See, e.g., NatalieY. Moore, Black Republicans:A Turn in the Culture Wars, Feb. 10,
2006, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/xhtml/articles/3256.html (last
visited March 1, 2007) ("Many of these pastors simply abandon traditional civil rights
issues. Gregory Daniels, a pastor in Chicago and ardent Bush supporter, made headlines
two years ago when he declared that if the Ku Klux Klan opposed gay marriage, he'd ride
with them.").
168. Cf Barbara Smith, quoted in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK:WRITINGS BY RADI-
CAL WOMEN O COLOR 61 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981 )(stating that the
reason that racism is a feminist issue is that the practice of feminism is free to all women,
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an anti-heterosupremacy principle serves to help maintain white suprem-
acy.
Fundamentally, the racism at the core of white supremacy and the
heterosexism and homophobia at the core of heterosupremacy are inter-
connected and interdependent. 169 The dominant/subordinate social
structure, used to maintain the power and control of the Euroheteropatri-
archal elite depend on both. As ProfessorValdes writes:
[Euroheteropatriarchy] signifies the commingling and confla-
tion of various supremacies: white supremacy, Anglo
supremacy, male supremacy, and straight supremacy. This term,
therefore, seeks to capture the interlocking operation of domi-
nant forms of racism, ethnocentrism, androsexism, and
heterocentrism-all of which operate in tandem in the United
States and beyond it to produce identity hierarchies that sub-
ordinate people of color, women, and sexual minorities in
different yet similar and familiar ways. In this way, Eurohet-
eropatriarchy also encompasses issues of language, religion, and
other features of "culture" and community that help to pro-
duce and sustain hierarchical social and legal relations.
Euroheteropatriarchy therefore denotes a specific form of sub-
ordination in a specific context, which encompasses and
enforces white racism and Anglo ethnocentrism, as well as an-
drosexism and heterosexism, normatively, politically, and
legally. 170
Racism, heterosexism, and homophobia connect (along with clas-
sism, sexism, and other subordinating ideologies) to form the base of
Euroheteropatriarchal elitism that maintains the white supremacy that
continues to exist today.171 The conclusion is that the State sanctioning of
same-sex marriage challenges white supremacy by legitimizing and sup-
porting intimate relationships, which are, by their very existence, counter
hegemonic and anti-subordinating. I use examples of both marriage and
non-marital relationships because I believe that the underlying debate is
including women of color, and that anything less is not feminism, but merely "female self-
aggrandizement").
169. Supporting the general proposition that "isms' are interdependent and intercon-
nected, See generally Crenshaw, supra note 122 (discussing the connection between racism
and sexism); Ehrenreich, supra note 139, at 257 (discussing how when those defined as
"singularly burdened individuals compensate for the powerlessness they experience by
using their privileged positionality to subordinate others, they often actually end up rein-
forcing the very systems that oppress them."); D.L. Hutchinson, Unseen, supra note 44 and
accompanying text (discussing this interconnectedness and the theoretical underpinnings).
170. Valdes, Outcrit, supra note 150, at 840-41.
171. See ld. at 840.
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about the relationships themselves. Though the specific argument set forth
in this Article is about formal legal recognition of same-sex relationships
through civil marriage, subordinating systems work on non-marital rela-
tionships in the same way they do on marital ones. I further argue that
there is a parallel between how those opposing same-sex marriage view
all LGBT relationships and how those who opposed interracial marriage
viewed all interracial relationships in that both oppositional groups be-
lieve such relationships to be "illicit sex", "contrary to God's will," or
unnatural."172 The contention is that while heterosexual marriages, as ex-
emplars of heteronormativity, may reinforce the status quo of white
supremacy, same-sex intimate relationships challenge white supremacy by
being non-normative. 173
B. Intersecting Identities and Mhite Superiority
Intimate interracial relationships can be destabilizing to the system
of subordination in that they have the potential to upset the white domi-
nant/minority subordinate status quo by seemingly raising the status of
one group while lowering the status of the other. Paradoxically, when it
comes to heterosexual interracial relationships, they are both destabilizing
to, yet reinforcing of, white supremacy. One reason this paradox exists
may stem from the public perception that a person of color is choosing to
involve herself with a White person to better herself. 74 This perception
stems from White racial idealism, the notion that "white is best."
172. Peggy Pascoe, "hy the Ugly Rhetoric Against Gay Marriage is Familiar to this Histo-
rian of Miscegenation, George Mason University, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, April 19, 2004,
available at http://hnn.us/articles/4708.html (last visited May 25, 2007); See also JOHN
D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS 295 (1988) (noting that "[n]ot only
homosexuality, but race too, served as a dividing line separating 'good' sexual mores from
'bad' ... "); ROOT supra note 78, at 36-7 (discussing similarities of language when talking
about interracial and LGBT sexuality).
173. Norm, KEY CONCEPTS IN CuLm RL THEORY 261-62, (Andrew Edgar & Peter
Sedgwick eds., 1999) ("A norm is a rule that governs a pattern of social behaviour," either
the ideal behavior or the "behaviour that is desired or prescribed." To be normative is to
construct or adhere to the norm, to be non-normative is to be the opposite.).
174. See MORAN, supra note 50, at 104-05; RENEE C. ROMANO, RACE MIXING: BLACK-
WHITE MARRIAGE IN POSTWAR AMERICA 56 (2003) (discussing the "exchange theory"
which posits that lower-class white women would marry upper-class black men thus ex-
changing a higher racial status for a higher economic status on the part of the women and
vice versa on the part of the men); see also KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note
78, at 25 (noting the fear that "'the negro will be endeavoring to usurp every right and
privilege... "'), at 281-338 (discussing the benefits of passing for white including being
accepted into white society).
175. KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 34 (discussing white "racial
idolatry" and black inferiority).
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White racial idealism can be perpetuated generationally by the con-
tinuation of the idea that children of any White/non-White interracial
union are better than children of color with very little or no White ances-
try because they have "white blood" and are thus of higher cultural
status. 176 The idea that the addition of any White blood leads to higher
cultural status exists even though children are still most often identified
with, and socially, legally and politically, categorized as being, the same
race as their of-color parent-especially if that parent is Black.'7 7 Regard-
less, the perception is that these biracial children are one step or
generation closer to whiteness or at least are closer to being able to pass
for White.18 For Blacks, passing for White has historically been, and con-
tinues to be, advantageous.'79 Passing has meant access to rights and
privileges reserved for the racially dominant class. 80 Those who cannot
176. See DEVON ABBOTT MIHESUAH, INDIGENOUS AMERICAN WOMEN: DECOLONIZA-
TION, EMPOWERMENT, ACTIVisM 89 (2003) (stating that if part of a child's heritage and
ancestry includes a dominant racial group, then that child may view that race as the supe-
rior race); MARIA P P. ROOT, Resolving "Other" Status: Identity Development of Biracial
Individuals, in AMERICAN FAMILIES: A MULTICULTURAL READER 442-43 (Stephanie Coontz
et al. eds., 1999) ("Once the child comprehends that there is a concept of superiority by
color, she or he may attempt to achieve acceptance by embracing membership in the 'hi-
erarchically superior' racial group of their heritage[.]"); Norman Yetman, Prejudice,
Discrinination, and Racism, in RACE, ETNINCITY, AND GENDER: SELECTED READINGS 12 (Jo-
seph F Healey & Eileen O'Brien eds., 2004) ("African Americans are still considered
inferior people; otherwise, they would be as well-off as whites."); Sharon E. Rush, Identity
Matters, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 909, 914 (2002) ("Whites continue to be the dominant race
because on some level of consciousness,Whites believe their fundamental identity as a race
includes being superior to all other races.").
177. See KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES supra note 78, at 34; MORAN, supra note
50, at 105; ROOT, supra note 78, at 81.
178. KENNEDY, INTrrERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 283 ("Passing is a deception
that enables a person to adopt specific roles or identities from which he or she would
otherwise be barred by prevailing social standards. The classic racial passer in the United
States has been the 'white Negro,' an individual whose physical appearance allows him to
present himself as 'white' but whose 'black' lineage (typically only a very partial black an-
cestry) makes him a Negro according to dominant racial rules.").
179. See KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 281-338 (defining pass-
ing and discussing the historical and contemporary advantages of being able to do so); see
also, ROOT, supra note 78, at 141 (discussing how "'Passing' as white ... was another strat-
egy for subverting and renegotiating race and the privileges and access that go with
whiteness."); HANEY LOPEZ, supra notel 14, at 192 (describing passing as the "ability of
some individuals to change race at will"); HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 114, at 199 (relating
the "presumptions of worth" that come with being perceived as white).
180. See HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 114, at 198-99 (discussing the high value placed
on whiteness); KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 286-97 (relating "pass-
ing stories" that exemplify numerous advantages a person would get from being perceived
as white); MORAN, supra note 50, at 47 ("Individuals with any African ancestry traditionally
were barred from all of the privileges associated with white identity. Passing became a way
for some blacks to circumvent the color line without directly challenging it.").
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pass however may still be able to improve their situations through an in-
terracial relationship. The idea is that a person of color is somehow
bettering herself and her children by forming a family with a White per-
son and she herself is thus able to move up-towards whiteness-through
this interracial intimate relationship. 8 1
Conversely, society still views Black as inferior and the White person
is "slumming" or lowering herself by being involved with a Black per-182
son. However, because of the exoticiziation of the sexuality of people of
color,8 3 society may understand why a White person might choose to be
sexually involved with a person of color. Interracial sexual relationships
can be constructed as Whites seeking a "walk on the wild side, 8 4 as suf-
fering from "jungle fever"'8' or as simply situationally necessary. 16 Though
understandable, especially if limited to short-term sex, crossing the color
line s7 is still a matter of the White person lowering her standards, and thus
her status, within aWhite-dominated society.' 8
Having a relationship, even one that is limited to being sexual, with
someone of a lower racial status has historically meant being branded a
criminal or ostracized from one's own race. 89 The social construction of
Whites who are intimately involved with non-Whites may still result in
the White person being shunned by family, friends and community. A per-
son who is perceived as less White according to social constructs means
181. See, e.g., MARITA GOLDEN, DON'T PLAY IN THE SUN: ONE WOMAN'S JOURNEY
THROUGH THE COLOR COMPLEX 3 (2004) ("This society measures progress for the negro by
how fast he can turn white." (quoting James Baldwin)); see also, MORAN, supra note 50, at
114-15.
182. See generally KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 34.
183. MORAN, supra note 50, at 114-15.
184. The phrase was coined from one of three sources, each of which refers to prosti-
tution and homosexuality. Lou REED, WALK ON THE WILD SIDE (RCA Records 1972);
WALK ON THE WILD SIDE (Columbia Pictures 1962); NELSON ALGREN, A WALK ON THE
WILD SIDE (1956).
185. This phrase is slang and denotes Black/White interracial relationships. See
GEORGE A. YANCEY, Debunking the Top Stereotypes About Interracial Couples, in JUST DON'T
MARRY ONE: INTERRACIAL DATING, MARRIAGE AND PARENTING 44 (George A. Yancey &
Sherelyn WhittumYancey eds., 2002);JUNGLE FEVER (40 ACRES & A MLE, 1991).
186. See, e.g., D'EMILIo & FREEDMAN, supra note 172, at 13-14 (noting that White
men would "take black wives or mistresses" because of the absence of White women in
the Colonial South).
187. See DuBoIs, supra note 121, at ix.
188. See KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note78, at 34 ("White racial narcis-
sism began the destructive spiral and is far more potent than black reactions, which are
essentially defensive and compensatory responses to white aggression.").
189. See MORAN, supra note 50, at 19 (noting that punishment could be banishment
or a jail sentence).
[VOL.13:177
Same-Sex Loving
that the individual is more closely related to the person of color's subor-
dinate racial status than to the dominant White racial status. 190
Both Whites and Blacks may be branded as "traitors to their race".91
However, the White partner is viewed as "lower[ing] the social status of
whites"' 192 and, as such, is relegated to a subordinated racial status much
closer to that of her non-White partner. Further, the White person is risk-
ing producing children who will not be White. 193 Even if her offspring are
referred to as biracial, they are still not White194 and therefore, the children
serve to weaken white supremacy by potentially raising the status of per-
sons of color.'99 This mixing of white and black to create biracial children
is the idea of creating a mongrel race that the State ofVirginia wanted to
prevent.'9 6 The prevention efforts existed because any racial identity that
was not purely white was inferior and threatening to white supremacy.197
This is not to say that interracial heterosexual relationships deliber-
ately continue to maintain white superiority, but rather that the popular
perception of interracial different-sex relationships, within of-color and
White communities, is that whiteness has an element of superiority.' "
This attitude of white superiority is reflected in the sense that people of
color have married up when they marry Whites, whereas Whites have
married down. 199 By marrying a White woman, a Black man is seen as
190. See RomAro, supra note 174, at 52-53.
191. YANcEY, supra note 185, at 49.
192. RoivA,/o, supra, note 174, at 53.
193. See KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 367-68 (explaining that
the children of slaves were black regardless of whether the father was a free White man or
not. "By treating as unambiguously 'black' the human products of interracial sexual unions,
authorities strove-usually successfully-to thwart any inclination toward interracial par-
enting."); see also ROOT, supra note 78, at 81 (stating that racial construction assigns
children a non-White status); YANCEY, supra note 185, at 47 ("[S]ome argue that White
partners [in interracial marriages] should be discouraged from having interracial children
because then those children will be kids of color.").
194. See KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIVLACIES, supra note 78, at 367-68; see also
RovmANo, supra note 174, at 53; ROOT, supra note78, at 81 (stating that racial construction
assigns children a non-White status);Yancey, supra note185, at 47.
195. See KENNEDY INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 158;Yancey, supra note
185, at 50.
196. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (citing Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87
S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955)) ("The State's legitimate purposes were 'to preserve the racial integ-
rity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,'
and 'the obliteration of racial pride"'.).
197. See, KENNEDY INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 18-20, 23-24; ROOT,
supra note 78, at 81.
198. SeeJENSEN, supra note 18, at 13-14; KENNEDY INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note
78.
199. See infra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing marrying up and marry-
ing down).
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reclaiming his manhood, which White society stole.200 Conversely, a White
man marrying a Black woman does not have the same social 
impact201
because of the unfettered access to Black women that White men have
had historically. While women tend to marry up socioeconomically,
when a White woman marries a Black man she has married down in the
context of racial, and thus social, status. However when a Black woman
203marries a White man, she has racially, and therefore socially, married up.
The social construction of homosexuality serves to limit the possi-
bility of LGBT persons of color accessing the equivalent of marrying up.
Not only is marriage itself barred, but the combination of public percep-
tion of non-heterosexuals, namely that they have both an undesirable
identity and inferior way of living, leads to the construction of LGBT
204persons as inferior to their heterosexual counterparts. Not only is ho-
200. Cf D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, Supra note 172, at 105, 202-203, 216-221; Fssrrz
FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS 63-82 (1967); KENNEDY INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra
note 78, at 122-23; ROOT, supra note 78 at 36-37; Gala Oliver, Sister Outsider Revisited,
CtmvE,Vol. 11 (Feb. 2001) ("The myth basically says that Black women not only dominate
the Black family, but are in cahoots with the White power structure to disempower Black
men."). Throughout history, even the hint of a relationship, real or imagined, between a
Black male and White female has been met with extremely disproportionate violence. See
generally DORA APEL, IMAGERY OF LYNCHING: BLACK MEN, WHITE WOMEN AND THE MOB
(2004) (exploring lynching of black men by white mobs); see also MAMIE TILL-MOBLEY
AND CHRISTOPHER BENSON, DEATH OF INNOCENCE: THE STORY OF THE HATE CRIME THAT
CHANGED AMERICA (2005) (discussing the case of Emmett Till, a black teenager who was
murdered for allegedly whistling at a White woman, as an example of the disproportionate
violence directed toward black men).
201. See generally R. Richard Banks & Su Jin Gatlin, African American Intimacy: The
Racial Gap in Marriage, 11 MICH.J. RACE & L. 115 (2005) (discussing the issues and statis-
tics of marriage and African American men and women).
202. See ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 102 (1968)("[W]hat has been happening
for the past four hundred years is that the White man, through his access to black women,
has been pumping his blood and genes into the blacks, has been diluting the blood and
genes of the blacks ... "); MICHELE WALLACE, BLACK MACHO AND THE MYTH OF THE SU-
PERWOMAN 12 (1979) ("[Bjlack women had for many years been overtly and covertly
available to white men... ").
203. One important note: there is an interracial marriage "gender gap" in Black
mixed-sex marriage rates. See, e.g., Steve Sailer, Interracial marriage gender gap grows, UPI
PREss INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 14, 2003) ("African American men had white wives 2.65
times more often than black women had white husbands. In other words, in 73 percent of
black-white couples, the husband was black. (This interracial gender gap is even sharper
among black-white couples who cohabit without being married. Five times as many black
men live with white women as white men live with black women.)").
204. See REKERS, supra note 135; see also Michelle Davies, Correlates of Negative Atti-
tudes Toward Gay Men: Sexism, Male role norms and male sexuality, 41 JOURNAL OF SEX
RESEARCH 259 (2004) ("Whilst many people believe that lesbians and gay men deserve the
same civil rights as the heterosexual population, they still hold very negative attitudes to-
ward gay people and their sexual behaviour."); Larry Kramer, To: Straights From: Gays
Subject: Hate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007 at A19 (asserting that "Gays are hated."); Bernard
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mosexuality viewed negatively, but it is also perceived as being White,
meaning that being a lesbian or gay man is seen as an attempt to identify
with part of White culture.2 ' The idea of claiming an identity based on
one's sexuality, announcing it to friends and family and then parading it
for all to see, is considered something "White people do.' 206 Further,
members of communities of color, specifically those in Black communi-
ties, have asserted that in the absence of white racism and white
supremacy, there would be no LGBT Blacks.0 7 More blame is heaped on
White culture by those who maintain that LGBT Whites have lured, or at
the very least encouraged, people of color into being LGBT.208 Being
turned into a homosexual or a bisexual and thus becoming White identi-
fied renders one racially inauthentic. 2° The idea that gay is White is also
perpetuated by both White-dominated LGBT communities and popular
culture as a whole.21 ' Individuals that represent LGBT communities in
popular culture and media are White lesbians, gays and bisexuals.2 1'
E. Whitley, Jr., Gender-role Variables and Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 45 SEX RoLEs: A
JOURNAL OF RESEARCH 691, 691 (2001) ("Prejudice against lesbians and gay men is wide-
spread in American society.").
205. BOYKIN, supra note 46, at 90 (quoting Dr. Ron Simmons, addressing the issue of
whether LGBT Blacks should refer to themselves as "gay." Dr. Simmons says, "1 can appre-
ciate the issue over whether or not we should call ourselves 'gay' as African people because
basically it is a white cultural term that white people created."); id. at 157 ("Homophobic
black intellectuals tend to view homosexuality in the black community either as an out-
growth of white racism or as a by-product of the breakdown of the black family.").
206. See, e.g., Gina Dent, Black Pleasure, Black Joy: An Introduction, in, BLACK POPULAR
Cui ruRE 3 (Gina Dent, ed. 1992), (describing "that notorious black manifesto-we will
not have our business put in the streets.").
207. BOYKIN, supra note 46, at 156-57; Henry Louis Gates Jr. Forward in THE GREAT-
EST TABOO, supra notel33, at xiv.
208. E.O. Hutchinson, My Gay Problem, supra note 133, at 4 ("Homosexuality was a
perverse contrivance of white males and white females that reflected the decadence of
white America"); see also HOOKS, Homophobia, supra note166, at 123 (discussing the verbali-
zation that "white people were encouraging black people to become homosexuals[.]").
209. RoOT, supra note 78, at 37; Greg Conerly, Are you Black First or are you Queer? in
THE GREATEST TABOO, supra note 133, at 9 ("[S]ome heterosexual blacks will see all black
lesbigays as denying their blackness, because to them homosexuality is something they
associate with white culture[.]").
210. See, e.g., Kate Kendell, Race, Same-sex Marriage, and White Privilege: The Problem
with Civil Rights Analogies, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 135 (discussing the lack of visibil-
ity of"queers of color").
211. See, e.g., television programs including Will and Grace, Ellen, Queer as Folk, and
Queer Eye for the Straight Guy (portraying LGBT storylines or with prominent LGBT cast
members who are all or mostly White). In addition, the entertainers, celebrities and ath-
letes who have come out as LGBT are almost exclusively White. Consider Ellen
DeGeneres, Rosie O'Donnell, Lance Bass, Melissa Ethridge, kd lang, Elton John, Alexis
Arquette and Martina Navratilova. I do not claim that there are no LGBT celebrities or
personalities of color, but the majority are White and they figure more prominently in
media and popular culture. Compare the careers of RuPaul, B.D. Wong, Wilson Cruz (all
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The effect of this public construction of homosexuality as both
White and deficient is to undermine the very idea of white superiority. If
the public perceives gay as White, and they also perceive gay as inferior,
then same-sex couples counter white superiority. Thus, the LGBT person
of color who is in a same-sex relationship with a White person cannot be
"marrying up" because the White partner, though individually of a higher
racial status when compared with her partner of color has a diminished
racial status by virtue of her sexual orientation. The White partner slides
down the racial hierarchy while the partner of color, already at the bot-
tom, simply remains there.
While heterosexual interracial intimate relationships can reinforce
the concept of white superiority, same-sex intimate relationships can
challenge it. Ongoing attitudes that support white superiority and notions
of marrying up or marrying down permeate the culture and thus effect all
relationships whether legally sanctioned through marriage or not. These
attitudes further the ways in which interracial mixed-sex marriage sup-
ports white supremacy. By including same-sex couples in those who are
able to access marriage, marrying up or down will lose some of its raciali-
zation in society at large because, through generally negative attitudes
towards homosexuality, White LGBT people and LGBT people of color
are constructed as more racially equal, both rendered to a low racial social
status.
Diminishment in the white-is-superior viewpoint also affects atti-
tudes about the racial status of children. LGBT couples who become
parents may have fewer concerns about their children's racial ancestry
given that many lesbians and gays adopt or use alternative reproductive
technology to create their families212 and thus may have less genealogical
information to access." 3 This may mean that the question of whether the
actors), Margaret Cho (comedian), professional athletes Greg Louganis, John Amachi and
Esera Tuaolo. The television shows that feature lesbian or gay people of color are generally
on cable, including Noah's Arc (featuring the lives of Black gay men on the LOGO Chan-
nel) Six Feet Under, The Wire, and The L Word.
212. See generally Dang & Frazer, supra note 41, at 22-26 (reporting facts on children in
Black same-sex households and noting that Black same-sex households also have a number
of biological children from previous relationships); Carl T. Hall, Gays, lesbians seeking parent-
hood increasingly turn to infertility clinics, S.E Chronicle, May 6, 2007, at Al (discussing the
increasing numbers of gay men and lesbians using assisted reproductive technology to be-
come parents); Gary J. Gates and MV. Lee Badgett of the Williams Institute and Kate
Chambers and Jennifer Macomber of the Urban Institute, Adoption and Foster Care by Gay
and Lesbian Parents in the United States, 7-11, 15-16 (March 2007), available at http://
www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute//pubhcations/FinalAdoptionlReport.pdf (last visited
May 29, 2007) (providing estimates of the statistics relating to the numbers of adopted and
fostered children with lesbian and gay parents).
213. See HANEY LoPEz, supra note 114, at 192 (Discussing the conceptualization of
ancestry: "Ancestry seems to be a biological concept, yet it is instead largely a social one
... Identifying one's ancestry then, involves a large degree of choice, where this choice
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children have any White ancestry is minimized. Further, even though
same-sex marriage is completely sanctioned in this country-of-the-
future, homosexuality will probably still be viewed as inferior to hetero-
sexuality and will probably still be perceived as a White cultural
construction. Therefore, if an LGBT person of color marries a White per-
son of the same sex, one still cannot accuse her of trying to better herself
because she has entered into a union, which, though state sanctioned,
continues to be perceived unfavorably and rendered to a lower social
status. Regardless, even with negative societal attitudes, granting same-sex
marriage rights would legitimize and support intimate relationships that
subvert attitudes of white superiority-necessary to maintain white su-
premacy-which in turn conforms with and advances Loving's
antisubordination principle.
C. Struck "Color-Blind": (Non)Normative Relationships
Turning to the third and final postulate; this section explores how
interracial same-sex relationships add a specific and direct challenge to
white supremacy that interracial mixed-sex relationships do not and that
intraracial same-sex relationships do only indirectly. Same-sex interracial
couples live at the intersection of racism and heterosexism, and therefore
provide examples of how white supremacy and heterosupremacy each
support the other.1 4 These couples, as individuals and as a pair, experience
racism, heterosexism and bias against interracial relationships. 215 The
prejudices these couples face can manifest in a number of ways, from the
micro aggressions '1 6 of daily life in a Euroheteorpatriarchal elitist world, to
verbal and physical abuse. 2"7 Additionally, the discrimination may take the
turns at least partially on the social significance of one line of decent versus another."). The
less information one has, I argue, the more choice one has.
214. Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 122, at 1244 (discussing the intersectionality of race
and gender). Here I apply it in the context of race and sexual orientation. This is not to
say there is no gender dynamic at work, but a discussion of how gender interacts with race
and (homo)sexual orientation is beyond the scope of this Article.
215. BOYKIN, supra note46, at 106-110, (discussing dynamics of and responses to
interracial same-sex relationships); D. MERILEE CLUNIS& G. DORSEY GREEN, LESBIAN COU-
PLES 131-42 (1988) (discussing the impact of racism on lesbian couples); c. KENNEDY,
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, supra note 78, at 109-10 (discussing three "camps" of African
Americans when it comes to Black/White interracial marriage. The "third camp repudi-
ates interracial marriage on the ground that black participation in it constitutes an
expression of racial disloyalty; implies disapproval of fellow blacks; impedes the perpetua-
tion of black culture; weakens the African American marriage market; and fuels racist
mythologies, especially the fiction that blacks lack pride of race." (endnote omitted)).
216. DELGADO & STEFANcIc, supra note 12, at 1-2, 151.
217. Press Release, FBI, FBI Releases its 2005 Statistics on Hate Crime (Oct. 16,
2006) (on file with author) (noting that an analysis of the 7,160 single-bias incidents by
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form of exclusion from community because of one's own race or the race
of one's partner or because of sexual orientation. Families of origin may
reject someone if she comes out as homosexual1 8 or if she couples with
someone of another race." 9 These biases and prejudices may lead to ac-
tions that help perpetuate heterosupremacy and white supremacy. Even
though positive opinions about interracial relationships are expanding in
220society at large, positive attitudes would not necessarily extend to same-
sex interracial relationships because of the same-sex nature of the rela-
tionships. This section posits that, as viewed by the dominant culture, the
sexual orientation of the individuals and the same-sex nature of an inter-
racial lesbian or gay couple serve to override the races of each member of
the pair, rendering their race invisible or at the very least, "see through."
Consequently, when exposed to interracial same-sex couples, society is, in
essence, struck "color-blind." Because it cannot see past the sameness of
the genders in the presumed homosexual couple, race becomes secon-
dary. 
2 1
Interracial same-sex intimate relationships where the parties are not
closeted and are thus more visibly same-sex and interracial, present the
most significant challenge to white supremacy, much more so than differ-
ent-sex interracial relationships that were specifically decriminalized in
bias motivation revealed that 54.7 percent were motivated by a racial bias, 17.1 percent
were triggered by a religious bias, 14.2 percent were motivated by a sexual-orientation
bias, and 13.2 percent of the incidents were motivated by an ethnicity/national origin
bias); see generally NAT. COAL. OF ArrI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, ANTI-LEsBAN, GAY, BISEXUAL
AND TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE IN 2006 2 (2007) (reporting incidences of violence directed at
members of LGBT communities).
218. See, e.g., BOYKIN, supra note 46, at 23-25; HOOKS, Homophobia, supra note 166, at
120.
219. See BOYKIN, supra note 46, at 106-07; HOOKS, Homophobia, supra note166, at 124;
PAUL C. ROSENBLATT ET AL., MULTIRACIAL COUPLES: BLACK & WHITE VOICES 107-16
(1995).
220. See MORAN, supra note 50, at 112 ("Loving arguably has transformed attitudes
toward intermarriage. In 1991, a Gallup Poll found for the first time that more Americans
approve of interracial marriage than disprove of it." (endnote omitted)); YANCEY, supra note
185, at 43 (noting that even though there is still hostility directed at interracial couples,
"overt support for interracial families has never been as high as it is today"); Sharon M.
Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: US. Racial and Hispanic Intermar-
riage, POPULATION BULLETIN, JUNE 2005, AT 3-4 (discussing changing attitudes towards
interracial marriage and multiracial families and children); Zhenchao Qian & Daniel T.
Lichter, Crossing Racial Boundaries: Changes of Interracial Marriage in America, 1990-2000
(presented Apr. 2004) (noting the "rapid increase of interracial marriage in the 1980's" led
some to conclude there was improvement in race relations, but authors recognized that
rates of interracial marriage remain low "accounting for less than three percent of all mar-
riages in 2000.").
221. See William Eskridge, Outsider-Insiders: The Academy of the Closet, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 977, 978-81 (1996) [hereinafter Eskridge, Outsider]; see also infra note 224 and
accompanying text (for a discussion of the concept of totalizing).
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Loving, and even more so than same-sex intraracial relationships. One
reason may be that visible same-sex couples allow individuals within soci-
ety, and society as a whole, which "is both anxious about and obsessed
with sexuality,' 223 to make sexual orientation into what Professor William
Eskridge has called "a totalizing feature. ' '2" Because of the totalizing of
sexual orientation, this single characteristic overwhelms other characteris-
tics such as race.2 While it is actually race that initially called attention to
the couple, regardless of the races of those in a same-sex relationship, sex-
ual orientation is highlighted.
The manner in which sexual orientation becomes a visible charac-
teristic and the way interracial same-sex couples incite social color-
blindness are connected. It is the very fact that the couples are interracial
that calls particularized attention to the sameness of the genders and the
homosexual orientation. The foregrounding of interracial homosexuality
may be so overwhelming as to strike the viewer temporarily "color-
blind"-unable to or disinclined to notice race. It is the visibility of the
interracialness of two women or two men that first draws attention to the
same-sexness and the same-sexness that renders their sexual orientation
extremely visible. As Professor Eskridge notes, once sexual orientation is
revealed it becomes an individual's total package such that other charac-
teristics, such as race, can become secondary.26
There is one caveat to this color-blindness, though it only occurs
if an observer perceives that the interracial same-sex pair is part of
an intimate, physical, emotional relationship. This is necessary for the
sexuality to become totalizing to the point of rendering race nearly in-
visible. The inability to perceive interracial relationships of any sort
227resulting from social and geographical segregation, as well as ongoing
222. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down a law criminalizing the
intermarriage of a White person and a black person as violating the central principle of
equality of the Fourteenth Amendment).
223. Eskridge, Outsider, supra note 223, at 978.
224. Id. at 979 (describing the "totalizing feature of sexual orientation" in the case of
legal scholars. "Disclosure of sexual preference" may overwhelm a scholar's ideas, generat-
ing a "loss of credibility and the diminishment of influence."); see also, William Eskridge,
No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial
Review, 75 N.YU. L. REv. 1327, 1334 (2000), [hereinafter Eskridge, No Promo Homo] ("As
it did with race, law's stigma helped create homosexuality as a totalizing and naturalized
identity trait, yet then contributed to the normative and descriptive destabilization of that
trait as a regulatory category.").
225. Eskridge, Outsider, supra note 222, at 980.
226. Id. at 979-80.
227. See BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, "WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER
IN THE CAFETERIA? AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 3-4 (1997) ("There is still a
great deal of social segregation in our communities. Consequently, most of the early in-
formation we receive about "others" ... does not come as a result of first hand
experience."); HANEY LOPEZ, supra notel 14, at 132 (discussing ongoing segregation in the
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racism 228 limit opportunities for cross racial interaction. Thus society may
be interracial-relationship blind, meaning that the first assumption by
both Whites and persons of color is that people of different races are not
even together.229 Therefore at first glance, an interracial pair may not be
identified as knowing each other, let alone perceived as being a couple.
However, if a second look is taken and the interracial same-sex pair is
understood as an intimate, romantic, sexual or dating couple, then the
"color-blindness" strikes because of the disconcerting nature of the "gay-
ness" of the relationship dynamic. 230 The perception of the individuals'
race in the same-sex couple-the interracialness of the two men or two
women-recedes and for a time only their sexuality is evident.231
While interracial same-sex couples may render society color-blind,
interracial heterosexual relationships magnify the race of each member of
the couple. The mixed-sex interracial couple is normative at least along
the axis of gender and sexual orientation. There is nothing unusual about
seeing a man and a woman as a couple. It is the interracial aspect of the
pair that is out of the ordinary and thus the fact that the individuals are of
different races becomes the couple's most noticeable characteristic. There-
fore, instead of rendering an observer color-blind, interracial mixed-sex
couples heighten the observer's perception of race.
The children of interracial mixed-sex couples also serve to magnify
race. Rather than creating color-blindness, there are still categories for
United States and its impact on each racial group's understanding of racial differences); see
also DAVID K. SHIPLER, A COUNTRY OF STRANGERS: BLACKS AND WHITES IN AME~iCA, 23-54
(describing voluntary segregation in modern-day schools).
228. See JENSEN, supra note 18, at 4 (noting "[White supremist ideology] has justified
legal and extralegal exploitation of every non-white immigrant group, and is used to this
day to rationalize the racialized disparities in the distribution of wealth and well-being in
this society.").
229. This is a frequent occurrence in my own life. Regularly, when my White partner
and I check-in at the host stand at a restaurant she is addressed first and asked "one for
dinner?"We have been on public transportation and have been asked, with incredulity in
the asker's voice, "Are you two friends?" See Mary R.Jackman and Marie Crane, "Some of
My Best Friends Are Black... ": Interracial Friendship and Whites' Racial Attitudes, 50 THE PuB-
LIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 459, 460 (1986) (noting the "rarity of interracial friendship").
230. See, e.g., Lisa Kahaleole Chang Hall, Bitches in Solitude: Identity Politics and Lesbian
Community, in SISTERS, SEXPERTS AND QUEERS: BEYOND THE LESBIAN NATION, 218, 228
(Arlene Stein ed., 1993) ("[There are questions] unaskable of the majority of the straight
world, unfamiliar with the basic context of gayness. Unacculturated straight people are
usually too caught up with in the shock of relatively simple homosexuality itself-the fact
of girls with girls and boys with boys...").
231. See supra note 40 (noting that there are interracial plaintiff couples in some sev-
eral same-sex marriage cases. However the issue of their interaciality is rarely discussed,
maybe because it is deemed irrelevant when the issue is sexuality).
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those who are "mixed-race," "multiracial" and "biracial. These catego-
ries emphasize race or color and reinforce the one-drop rule.23 The
offspring of interracial relationships tend to be classified as belonging to a
particular race according to the color of their skin.3
"Color-blindness" is tied to same-sex marriage in that marrying, as
a public act, brings visibility to the races and sexes of the couple. A cere-
monial marriage requirement is for the pair to present themselves
together in front of an official to validate them as a couple. 2 The act of
marrying calls attention to the interracial same-sex couple as fundamen-
236tally non-normative. Society cannot be "interracial relationship blind"
when a couple chooses to marry. Thus by marrying, the interracial same-
sex couple has rendered clearly visible both their interracialness and their
status as a same-sex intimate couple, which in turn serves to strike society,
at least temporarily, color-blind.
The color-blindness inspired by interracial same-sex couples may
seem like a negative; however, some considered color-blindness to be a
social good because it supposedly invokes equal treatment of the races. 7
The failure to see or care about the races of two individuals because one
is so overwhelmed by their sexual orientation may not initially seem like
a good worth attaining. It nevertheless challenges white supremacy by
temporarily balancing White and non-White parties as equally 'queer.
238
Color-blindness also manages to bring visibility to LGBT people, which,
through exposing more people to others who are lesbian or gay, can work
to counter heterosupremacy. Through simply being visibly same-sex and
interracial, these relationships further Loving's anti-white supremacist mes-
sage by helping to mute the race of an individual and making it possible
for her other characteristics to be considered. Thus color-blindness,
232. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethic Classifications Used in
Census 2000 and Beyond (Apr. 12, 2000) (on file with author) (reporting the changes to
the racial categories as including a sixth racial category as "Some Other Race" and "al-
low[ing] respondents to check one or more races to which they self identify"); see also
AMERISTAT POPULATION REFERENCE BuREAu, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE CENSUS: 1860
TO 2000, (Feb. 2000) (providing a history of racial and ethnic categories in the census from
1860).
233. MORAN, supra note 50, at 2 (defining the one-drop rule as "any trace of African
ancestry makes [someone] black.").
234. DELGADO & STEEANCic, supra note 12, at 153 (2001) ("Race: Notion of a distinct
biological type of human being, usually based on skin color or other physical characteris-
tics.").
235. See 55 CJ.S. Marriage § 30 (1998) (Solemnization).
236. Supra note 173 (defining normative).
237. Cf Haney Lopez, supra note114, at 176-77 (discussing color-blind constitution-
alism and race blindness).
238. 1 use this word intentionally for the double meaning of "odd" as well as the
reclaimed name for people who self-identity as LGBT.
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resulting from seeing same-sex couples, which came to one's attention
because of the interracialness of the pair being perceived, manages to sub-
vert white supremacy. It does so by putting both parties in a same-sex
interracial relationship on the same level as one another. White is not
dominant and of-color is not subordinate.
CONCLUSION: LOVING COUPLES:
239
EXTENDING CIVIL (MARRIAGE) RIGHTS
My husband, Martin Luther King Jr., understood that all forms of
discrimination and persecution were unjust and unacceptable for a great
democracy. He believed that none of us could be free until all of us
were free, that a person of conscience had no alternative but to defend
the human right of all people .... Gays and lesbians and their families
are not loopholes to be closed. They are human beings to be affirmed
and treated equally.... The civil rights movement that I believe in
thrives on unity and inclusion, not division and exclusion. All of us
who oppose discrimination and support equal rights should stand to-
240gether to resist every attempt to restrict civil rights in this country.
Through this examination of the Loving Analogy and its applicabil-
ity in the same-sex marriage context, this work suggests that the
discriminatory, anti-freedom-of-choice, and heterosexist nature of gender
and sexual orientation based marriage restriction laws, 4' are comparable
to the discriminatory, rights-restricting and racist nature of the antimisce-
242genation laws struck down only 40 years ago. After exploring the
similarities between the social, political and legal struggles of same-sex
and interracial couples, it seems that indeed laws barring same-sex mar-
riage will eventually become a relic of history, as have antimiscegenation
laws.
It was 1948 when the state of California struck down its antimisce-
genation law.243 Nineteen years later, in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court
brought forth to the nation as a whole, the fundamental truth, articulated
by the Perez Court, that, "the right to marry is to join in marriage with
239. A thank you goes to Rashmi Goel for this phrase.
240. The International Gay and Lesbian Association, Coretta Scott King Urges No Vote
on Prop 22, available at http://www.ilga.info/Information/ moved-interestedentertained/
corettascott king.urges.no.vote.htm (quoting Coretta Scott King) (last visited Feb. 26,
2006).
241. See supra Part L.B 2 and accompanying text. (discussing marriage restrictions
based on sex and sexual orientation).
242. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
243. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 17 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
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the person of one's choice."24 In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts extended the right to marry to same-sex couples.24 If his-
tory repeats itself and nineteen years pass, 2022 may be the year that
marriage rights are extended to all same-sex couples in the United States.
This Article has argued that the sanctioning of same-sex marriage
continues what Loving started-challenging white supremacy and disman-
tling subordinating ideologies in the context of intimate relationships. The
aspects of the analogy outlined in Part I are essentially what Loving stands
246for or against: 1) for the freedom to marry the person of ones choice, 2)
against discrimination in the exercising of the right to decide whom to
marry, 47 and 3) against governmentally sanctioned subordination, espe-
cially in the form of white supremacy.248 Same-sex marriage specifically
extends each of these previously articulated principles by broadening in-
dividuals' marriage choices to include persons of the same sex, allowing
for the exercise of a fundamental right without regard for gender or sex-
ual orientation, and challenging notions of heterosupremacy and white
supremacy. This leads one to conclude that it is the predictable and cor-
rect outcome for these principles articulated in Loving to be applied in the
context of same-sex marriage. These Loving principles, freedom of choice,
antidiscrimination, and antisubordination arguably appear in two other
Supreme Court cases extending the rights of LGBT persons: Lawrence v.
Texas244 which applied the freedom of choice principle to choosing with
whom, including homosexuals, to have intimate relations, 2s ' and Romer v
Evansf which incorporated both the anti-discrimination and anti-
subordination principles into its decision that laws could not enacted if
they were based on animus and that gays and lesbians could not be rele-
gated to a particularly disadvantaged status.252 Also same-sex marriage has
been extended to citizens of Belgium, Canada, South Africa, Spain and
The Netherlands based on Constitutions and Charters comparable to the
244. Id. at 19; see also, Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (articulating "that the freedom of choice
to marry not be restricted...").
245. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,969 (Mass. 2003).
246. Loving, 338 U.S at 12; Perez, 198 P.2d at 19; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942).
247. Loving, 338 U.S. at 12; Perez, 198 P.2d at 21.
248. Loving, 338 U.S. at 11.
249. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas sodony law).
250. Id. at 567.
251. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (Colo., 1996) (striking down an amendment to
the Colorado Constitution which prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action
designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination).
252. Id. at 632.
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U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights. s3 Though it has been suggested that the
same-sex relationship recognition to come may be something short of
marriage,- 4 Professor Tom Grey, who in a 1980 article predicted that the
U.S Supreme court would "[find] fornication and sodomy laws ... un-
constitutional,' 25s envisions a time when same-sex relationships will be
... recognized as legitimate ... Not because they need it for
their happiness (though they may), but because society needs it
to avoid the insecurity and instability generated by the exis-
tence in its midst of a permanent and influential subculture
outside the law. Effective regulations of the family and com-
munity life of gay people will require that laws which
symbolically claim their sexual identity illegitimate in the eyes
of the larger society must be eliminated.2 6
Further, if one considers the determination by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court that civil unions would not perform the functions of mar-
riage, it follows that the State must include same-sex couples under its
marriage laws.5 7
It is not just that interracial marriage and same-sex marriage are
comparable, but that, by challenging heterosupremacy, undermining atti-
tudes of white superiority and rendering society color-blind, same-sex
marriage actually responds to Loving's specific race based aspects, includ-
ing the determination that white supremacy is neither compelling nor
legitimate.
In the forty years since the Loving decision, the number of interra-
cial (mixed-sex) relationships has increased.2 8 On the surface, these
253. See, Paul Axel-Lute, Same-Sex Marriage:A Selective Bibliography, available at http://
law-library.rutgers.edu/SSM.html#foreign (providing access to summaries of same-sex
marriage law in foreign jurisdictions).
254. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 83, 97 (1980) (using the language "something like marriage").
255. Id. But note however, it was twenty-three years after Professor Grey published
his prediction that the U.S Supreme Court determined sodomy laws to be unconstitu-
tional in Lawrence v. Texas.
256. Id.
257. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 440 Mass. 1201, 802 N.E.2d 565
(Mass., 2004) arguably his prediction applies to civil marriage as well. But see McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S. Ct. 2833 (1964) (striking down a Florida law that penalized
interracial fornication). Only three years passed between this Supreme Court decision and
the Loving decision. Lawrence was decided in 2003 and the U.S. Supreme court has yet to
hear a case addressing same-sex marriage.
258. William H. Frey, Charticle, THE MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEw 7- 10(Third Quarter
2003) (reporting a rise in the number of mixed-race marriages, up from "one in 23" in
1990 to "one in 15" in 2000); That's a Family! Statistics on US Families, available at
http://www.womedia.org/taf statistics-print.htm ("There are more than 4.5 million
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relationships may appear to strike a blow to white supremacist attitudes,
but in reality, their heterosexual nature supports attitudes of heterosu-
premacy and white superiority as well as serving to magnify race:
therefore, they also help support, rather than undermine, white supremacy.
Even if there are more interracial relationships now than in the days be-
fore Loving, the full potential of the Loving decision has yet to be realized.
Sanctioning same-sex marriage and supporting LGBT relationships
would be a further step toward implementing all of that for which Loving
stands.
Loving was, and continues to be, about more than marriage. It stands
for the principle that white supremacy is not a legitimate or compelling
governmental interest.2 9 It spelled the diminishment of dictating racial
categories through the "one-drop rule, 26° and determined that animus
cannot be the reason for a law's " The Loving decision also
looked toward to a time when work toward racial harmony would begin,
by endorsing the viewpoint that allowing people to marry whomever
they wanted would promote racial harmony by promoting better personal
and intimate relationships through friendships, extended families, and
children. Author Renee Romano explains:
The old segregationist fear that integration would lead to "race
mixing" was well-founded. Meaningful integration allows
blacks and whites to meet, to transcend the cultural and his-
torical legacies that hinder healthy relationships, and to marry
if they so choose. There is no question that interracial love will
become more common and even more accepted as racial bar-
riers erode in American society, but it will take more than love
to break down those barriers. Old hierarchies must be disman-
tled for new attitudes about interracial love and marriage to
flourish 2
married and unmarried couples in the United States who are mixed racially or ethnically)
(citation omitted); Table MS-3. Interracial Married Couples: 1980 to 2002, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabMS-3.pdf (table showing num-
bers of interracial marriages for each year from 1980 through 2002).
259. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
260. See Id. at 5 n.4 (citing Section 1-14 of the Virginia Code defining colored per-
sons as "every person in whom there is ascertainable any negro blood... .
261. Id. at 12.
262. RQOMANO, supra note 174, at 287-95; See also KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES,
supra note 78, at 35 ("genuine, loving interracial intimacy" is a "positive ideal."); ROOT,
supra note 78, at 3 ("Although not intended as a political tool, each interracial marriage
helps to change long-held assumptions and social conventions.").
FALL 2007]
Michigan journal of Race & Law
Same-sex marriages will also promote racial harmony, because they chal-
.263
lenge subordination. The sanctioning of same-ex relationships only
furthers the anti-white supremacist message of Loving v. Virginia and takes
another step down the road to racial equality.
Recognizing that there is a legitimate connection between interra-
cial and same-sex marriage should encourage communities of color,
specifically Black communities, to embrace same-sex marriage as a civil
r 
26 4
rights issue. It should also compel LGBT communities to include issues
specific to LGBT people of color as part of marriage rights activism.
26
1
Communities of color need to deal specifically with issues of homopho-
bia and LGBT communities must work against racism. These
communities and the issues they face are interconnected and interde-
266pendent. Countering subordination should be a common goal of all
subordinated communities. There are out interracial same-sex couples
who, whether seeking access to marriage or not, are living challenges to
subordination by openly loving someone who is of the same gender as
well as a different race.
Once the centrality of interracial same-sex couples is acknowledged,
the movement for marriage equality can influence antiracist work and the
potential of Loving can be truly realized. Interracial same-sex couples are
gap bridgers and can bring together of-color and LGBT activists who
understand that inserting discrimination against gays and lesbians into the
law, through statutes or constitutional amendments, begins a slippery slope
to backtracking on other civil rights gains. Same-sex marriage fully com-
pletes the determination of marrying the "person of one's choice; 67it
fundamentally undermines white supremacy, which, as Loving articulated,
is not a compelling reason to bar marriage.
268
263. See supra Part II.B. (defining and discussing subordination).
264. See supra note 241 (Coretta Scott King endorsing same-sex marriage); See also
Julian Bond, Is Gay Rights a Civil Rights Issue? A Symposium Leaders Debate Same-sex Mar-
riages and Gay and Lesbian Rights, Ebony July, 2004, at 142 (Civil Rights Leader, Board
Chairman NAACP stating "ARE gay rights civil rights? Of course they are. 'Civil rights'
are positive legal prerogatives-the right to equal treatment before the law.These are rights
shared by all-there is no one in the United States who does not-or should n[o]t--share
in these rights." (emphasis in the original)); Harvard Educational Review, Cornell West On
Heterosexism and Transformation: An Interview, in DANGEROUS LIAISONs: BLACKS, GAYs, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, 290-305 (Eric Brant ed., 1999) (discussing his belief in a
connection between LGBT rights and communities and rights for Blacks and other mi-
norities).
265. See, e.g., http://www.freedomtomarry.org (providing examples of how LGBT
marriage rights activists are beginning to acknowledge and forefront people of color and
their issues).
266. See generally supra, Part II.A (discussing the connection between heterosuprem-
acy and white supremacy).
267. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 19, 21, 31. (Cal. 1948)(en banc).
268. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
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The most basic argument for equal marriage rights is that all of so-
ciety benefits from the civil sanctioning of couples. The reasons the State
initially "created" marriage, namely to privatize caretaking and create so-
cial order by dispersing the burdens and responsibilities through offering
benefits and rights,2'6 9 are only enhanced when more people have access to
it. Through fulfilling freedom of choice, countering discrimination, and
challenging white supremacy, same-sex marriage makes the culture
stronger. Expanding access to the fundamental civil right of marriage to
include all couples who care to partake in it is to embrace Loving to its
fullest.
269. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (stating
that civil marriage was a creation of the government and is regulated through the state
police power); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (stating that regulating mar-
riage is exclusively a power of the state and this "power to regulate the marriage relation
includes the power to determine the requisites of a valid marriage contract and to control
the qualifications of the contracting parties... ").
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